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WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
IV. BANKRUPTCY & CREDITORS' RIGHTS
A. ERISA and Tenneco: A One-Two Punch on Judgment
Creditors Garnisheeing Pension Accounts
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act'
(ERISA) to alleviate the problems previously associated with private pension
plans.' A pension plan is an arrangement between an employer and his
employees for the establishment and maintenance of a fund to provide retire-
ment income for the employees.' To protect the monies in a pension fund
account until a beneficiary's retirement 4 ERISA prohibited the alienation or
assignment of the beneficiary's interest in the pension plan.' Many courts have
considered whether ERISA's alienation and assignment provisions prohibit
garnishment of a beneficiary's interest in a qualified pension plan because
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1976)). In general, ERISA defines the minimum
requirements for participating in a pension plan and receiving benefits. See Jennings, Preminger,
& Alexander, Wat Do You Get With the Gold Watch? An Analysis of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 17 ARiz. L. REv. 426, 427 (1975); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (stan-
dards for participation and vesting of benefits). ERISA also has provisions that prevent the
mismanagement of pension plans, require sufficient funding of pension plans, and prevent the
failure of pension plans. Jennings, Preminger & Alexander, supra, at 427. ERISA's provisions
establish standards for reporting to the government and disclosure to plan beneficiaries, claims
procedures and judicial review, and standards of fiduciary responsibility. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. §§
1021-1031 (statutory reporting and disclosure requirement); id. §§ 1132-1133 (claims procedures
and judicial review); id. §§ 1101-1114 (standards of fiduciary responsibility). See generally Jenn-
ings, Preminger, & Alexander, supra, at 427-461 (overview of ERISA's statutory requirements
and provisions).
2. See H. R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4670, 4672-73. Prior to Congress' enactment of ERISA, many problems plagued
pension plans. Id. The problem areas included insufficient coverage for workers in small businesses
and in agriculture, discrimination under the law against the self-employed and those not covered
by retirement plans, insufficient requirements for vesting and funding of benefits, loss of pension
benefits due to plan termination, misuse of pension funds, and inadequate disclosure to pension
beneficiaries. Id. at 4678-81; see Snyder, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 219, 223-26 (1975) (problems of pension trusts from 1942 to 1973).
3. See Note, The Pension Reform Act of 1974: Brave New World of Retirement Security,
27 U. FLA. L. REv. 1044, 1046-50 (1975) (description of pension plan).
4. See H. R. RaP No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4670, 4670 (purpose of ERISA is to provide retirement income for working people);
see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976) (purpose of ERISA is to provide retirement income for
beneficiary and his family).
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1976). To qualify as an ERISA trust, § 1056(d)(1) requires
a retirement plan to include a provision prohibiting the pensioner from assigning or alienating
the pension plan's benefits. Id. § 1056(d)(1). Subsection 1056(d)(2), however, permits a beneficiary
to voluntarily and revocably assign up to ten percent of any benefit payment. Id. § 1056(d)(2).
In addition to ERISA's anti-alienation provision, IRC § 401(a) requires that a pension plan in-
clude anti-assignment and alienation clauses to qualify for the beneficial tax treatment granted
to ERISA qualified trusts. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1976). Section 401(a) also prohibits a plan
from discriminating in favor of highly compensated corporate officers or employee-shareholders.
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ERISA does not mention garnishment. 6 The Fourth Circuit, in Tenneco, Inc.
v. First Virginia Bank of Tidewater 7 recently examined whether a judgment
creditor could garnishee a beneficiary's interest while the benefits remained
in the hands of an ERISA trustee and whether a judgment creditor could gar-
nishee the proceeds of an ERISA pension after the trustee distributed the funds
to the beneficiary.8
In Tenneco, Donald Sweeney's employment was terminated before
Sweeney's retirement from the Tenneco subsidiary, Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Company." Sweeney had participated in Tenneco's ERISA-
qualified pension plan until Sweeney quit working with the shipbuilding
company.'I The Tenneco pension plan required Tenneco to pay a beneficiary
all accrued benefits if the beneficiary quit working before retirement.'" Ten-
See id. § 401(a)(4). Furthermore, section 401(a) states that a qualified plan must include provi-
sions prohibiting the use of the trust for any purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of
the employees and the employees' beneficiaries. See id. § 401(a)(2).
Three significant tax advantages accrue to those benefitting from and contributing to a qualified
employee retirement plan. See Comment, ERISA: Does It Prohibit a State Court from Attaching
Plan Benefits?, 40 U. Pir. L. REV. 47, 48 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Plan Benefits]. First,
employers may deduct from gross income employee contributions to a qualified plan. I.R.C.
§ 404(a) (1976). Second, the Internal Revenue Service may not tax the employee on employer
contributions to a qualified plan until the beneficiary actually receives the monies in the form
of benefit payments. Id. § 402(a)(I). Third, neither the qualified pension plan, the beneficiary,
nor the employer currently pays tax on the income from the plan assets. Id. § 501(a). See general-
ly, Comment, Plan Benefits, supra, at 48 (tax benefits for qualified ERISA pension plans).
6. See, e.g., Operating Eng'rs' Local No. 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 650
F.2d 196, 199 (9th Cir. 1981) (ERISA does not preclude garnisheeing pension benefits to satisfy
court ordered spousal maintenance); General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 463 (6th Cir.
1980) (ERISA account not subject to garnishment by creditor of plan beneficiary); Cody v. Riecker,
594 F.2d 314, 315 (2d Cir. 1979) (garnishment of benefits not in conflict with ERISA when sought
in support of judgment for arrearages in wife and child support); American Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (garnishment order used to satisfy court-ordered fami-
ly support payments impliedly excepted from alienation and assignment proscription of ERISA);
Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 526 F. Supp. 510, 516 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) (ERISA exempts pension benefits from creditor's claims); Seneco of Fla., Inc. v. Clark,
473 F. Supp. 902, 907-08 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (wife's post judgment garnishment of husband's pen-
sion benefits pursuant to court support order not precluded by ERISA); General Motors Corp.
v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466, 468 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (ERISA precludes creditor's garnishment
of pension plan benefits). Many courts have considered whether ERISA allows the garnishment
of pension benefits to satisfy obligations under family support decrees. See infra note 31 (discus-
sion of judicially-created exception for support payments due to children and former wives). Other
courts have specifically considered the garnishment of pension benefits in the more general debtor-
creditor relationship. See infra text accompanying notes 50-87 (discussion of garnishment of pen-
sion benefits by judgment creditor).
7. 698 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1983).
8. Id. at 689-90.
9. Id. at 689.
10. Id.
11. Id. The Tenneco plan's terms required both the employer and the employee to make
contributions to the pension fund. Id. at 690. The pension plan provided that after two years
participation, an employee could withdraw up to 750 of the employee's own contributions credited
toward the employee's account. Id.
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neco's pension plan also required Tenneco to pay the accrued benefits within
a reasonable time after a beneficiary requested payment.2 Pursuant to the
Tenneco pension plan's terms, Sweeney withdrew 37,000 dollars of benefits
that Sweeney had accrued under the Tenneco plan.' 3 Sweeney, however, left
5,000 dollars of accrued benefits in the Tenneco pension plan.'
4
After Sweeney's 37,000 dollars withdrawal from the Tenneco pension plan,
First Virginia Bank of Tidewater (First Virginia) obtained a judgment against
Sweeney and his wife for 137,000 dollars.15 Using a writ of garnishment, First
Virginia attempted to compel Tenneco to pay to the bank the 5,000 dollars
remaining in Sweeney's ERISA pension account.' 6 First Virginia also garnisheed
the 37,000 dollars in ERISA fund proceeds that Sweeney had transferred to
Sweeney's broker.' 7 Tenneco and Sweeney petitioned the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin First Virginia's garnish-
ment of Sweeney's ERISA account.' Moreover, Sweeney asked the court to
require First Virginia to return to Sweeney the ERISA fund proceeds that First
Virginia had garnisheed from Sweeney's broker. 9
The district court denied Tenneco's and Sweeney's motions to enjoin First
Virginia's garnishment of Sweeney's ERISA account, holding that First Virginia
properly garnisheed both the 5,000 dollars remaining in the pension account2"
and the monies in Sweeney's broker's possession. 2 As to the amounts remaining
in the pension account, the district court distinguished between paying the
account balance in a preretirement lump sum and paying the amount only
upon retirement.2 2 The district court held that ERISA prohibited garnishments
only when a trustee might pay the account balance on retirement. 23 Further-
12. Id. at 689.
13. Id. In addition to the danger of garnishment of monies withdrawn from a pension
fund, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) subjects a pension plan distribution to taxation in the
year the trustee distributes the monies to the beneficiary. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(1), (2) (1976).
14. See 698 F.2d at 689.
15. Id.
16. Id. First Virginia sued Tenneco pursuant to Virginia's garnishment statute. See VA.
CODE § 8.01-511 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1983). Virginia's garnishment statute grants a judgment
creditor the power to require the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment to serve sum-
mons on both the judgment debtor and on the garnishee holding any amounts owing to the judg-
ment debtor. Id.; see id. § 8.01-512.3 (form of garnishment summons). The statute requires a
summoned garnishee to appear in court or file a verified affidavit or statement showing the amount
the garnishee owes to the judgment debtor or what property or effects the garnishee holds for
the judgment debtor. See id. § 8.01-515. Furthermore, the Virginia garnishment statute grants
the court the discretion to order the judgment debtor or the garnishee to pay to the court the
amounts or property owed. See id. § 8.01-516.
17. 698 F.2d at 690.
18. Id. at 689-90.
19. Id. at 690.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 691.
22. Id. at 690.
23. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 33-34 (Fourth Circuit's analysis of district
court's decision to treat plans providing for lump sum distributions different than plans pro-
viding for periodic distributions).
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more, the district court held that Sweeney controlled and constructively received
the 5,000 dollars still in the Tenneco pension account because the pension
plan required Tenneco to pay the 5,000 dollars at Sweeney's request.2 ' The
district court also held that ERISA did not exempt from garnishment the 37,000
dollars Sweeney transferred to the broker after Sweeney withdrew the money
from Tenneco's retirement plan.2" The district court reasoned that merely
because the funds originated in an ERISA plan did not exempt the monies
from garnishment after distribution.
26
On appeal from the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that a judgment creditor could not garnishee pension benefits remaining in
the hands of an ERISA fiduciary. "7 The court noted that ERISA and the In-
ternal Revenue Code require each qualified pension plan to contain provi-
sions against an assignment or alienation of benefits. 28 The Fourth Circuit
observed that the Treasury Regulations further clarified the tax code's section
on alienation and assignment. 29 The regulations specifically prohibit the
anticipation, assignment, or alienation of pension benefits and preclude sub-
jecting the pension benefits to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution, or
other legal or equitable process.3 0 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit noted that
the sole judicial exception to the absolute prohibition against alienation and
assignment only applies when the debt is for support of a beneficiary's children
or former spouse.' The Tenneco court noted ERISA's broad statutory pur-
24. 698 F.2d at 690.
25. Id. at 691.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 689.
28. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1976) (qualified pension plan must prohibit alienations
and assignments); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1976) (qualified plan must include clause prohibiting alienation
and assignment of pension benefits). The amendments to the Internal Revenue Code in ERISA
set forth certain criteria as prerequisites for qualifying as a pension plan. I.R.C. § 401(a). The
Code states as one of the criteria that a qualified plan must contain a clause prohibiting aliena-
tion or assignment of pension benefits. Id. § 401(a)(13); see supra note 5 (other tax code criteria
for qualified pension plans). ERISA and the IRC do not completely prohibit alienation and assign-
ment of pension benefits because the statutes permit a voluntary and revocable assignment of
10% or less of any benefit payment. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (beneficiary may voluntarily and
revocably assign 10% or less of any benefit payment); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (beneficiary may
make voluntary and revocable assignment of 10% or less of any benefit payment).
29. 698 F.2d at 689; see Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1978) (ERISA prohibits garnish-
ment of pension benefits); see also infra text accompanying notes 66-73 (Sixth Circuit's analysis
of Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1)).
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(l)-13(bXl) (1978); see infra text accompanying notes 66-73 (Sixth
Circuit's analysis of Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1)).
31. 698 F.2d at 689-90. Public policy grounds justify the judicially-created implied excep-
tion allowing garnishment of a pension plan in the case of overdue wife and child support payments.
See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1979) (any increase in plan
administration costs must give way to social benefits of allowing garnishment for family support
obligations). Courts refuse to impose on the public the costly burden that would result if depen-
dent spouses and children resorted to welfare assistance because the spouse and children could
not enforce support order against an interest in a former spouse's pension plan. See id. One
court distinguished the claims of family members from the claims of other creditors in two ways.
See Seneco of Fla., Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902, 907 (M.D. Fla. 1979). First, the Clark court
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pose of providing for the beneficiary and his family as the reason for
distinguishing familial support payments from attachments for the benefit of
other creditors. 32 Finally, the appellate court found no basis for the district
court's decision to treat plans providing for lump sum distributions different-
ly from plans providing for periodic distributions.3 3 The Fourth Circuit stated
that ERISA and the Treasury Regulations made no distinction between fully
vested funds subject to lump sum withdrawal and funds subject to periodic
disbursement as an annuity. 3 The Tenneco court reasoned that ERISA's
statutory scheme intended to protect the amounts in an employee's pension
plan until retirement regardless of whether the employee obtained another job,
quit work entirely, or otherwise received the right to a lump sum distribution.3
The Fourth Circuit, therefore, held that First Virginia's writ of garnishment
could not reach the balance of Sweeney's ERISA account.
36
Even though the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment creditor could
not garnishee funds remaining in the ERISA trustee's possession, the Fourth
Circuit agreed with the district court's ruling that First Virginia could gar-
nishee funds Sweeney had collected previously from the ERISA account. 37
The Fourth Circuit found that no ERISA provision supported Sweeney's claim
that funds traceable to a qualified ERISA account remained forever immune
from garnishment. 3 The court suggested that a beneficiary could prevent at-
stated that Congress intended ERISA to protect pension beneficiaries and their families but did
not intend ERISA to protect business creditors. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976) (purpose
of ERISA is to provide retirement income for beneficiary and his family). Second, the Clark
court noted that creditors do not have to extend credit to a person whose main assets consist
of an interest in a pension plan, while the former spouse and children do not have a similar
choice. See Clark, 473 F. Supp. at 907. The implied exception allowing garnishment of pensions
for family support obligations also permits garnishment of pension plans to collect the former
spouse's share of community property. See Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1980)
(garnishment for collection of share of community property not precluded by ERISA's preemp-
tion provisions), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981). But see Francis v. United Technologies Corp.,
458 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (ERISA preempts operation of California's community
property law that purported to give nonemployee spouse interest in plan benefits).
32. 698 F.2d at 690. The Congressional findings and declarations of policy in enacting ERISA
state that Congress found it desirable and in the interest of employees and the employees'
beneficiaries to pass a pension reform act. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976). Congress found that
the pension plans directly affected millions of employees and employees' dependents. Id. Con-
gress also stated that the termination of plans before the requisite retirement funds accumulate
deprived employees and employees' families of anticipated benefits. Id. Congress thus declared
that ERISA's policy should include protecting both the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and the interests of the participants' beneficiaries. Id. § 1001(b), (c).
33. 698 F.2d at 690.
34. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976) (beneficiary may not assign or alienate pension
benefits); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (pension plan must include prohibition on alienation or assignment
of benefits); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1978) (ERISA prohibits garnishment of pension
benefits).
35. 698 F.2d at 690; see supra note 1 (discussion of general statutory scheme of ERISA).
36. 698 F.2d at 690.
37. Id. at 691.
38. Id. Although the Tenneco court found that a qualified ERISA trust could not prevent
the garnishment of funds after distribution of the funds from the ERISA trust, in reaching the
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tachment of benefits after distribution solely by reinvesting the benefits in
a new ERISA account within sixty days of distribution as provided in ERISA.
39
The Tenneco court, however, noted that Sweeney did not reinvest the pro-
ceeds in another ERISA account and therefore held that First Virginia could
garnishee the money Sweeney left in the broker's possession. 40
In reaching the Tenneco decision, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the rele-
vant ERISA sections, the provisions of the tax code, and the corresponding
treasury regulations, 41 but failed to discuss the ERISA preemption provision.
42
The ERISA preemption provision states that ERISA supersedes any and all
state laws insofar as they relate to any employee benefit plan.43 Some courts
have found that Congress intended to preempt all state laws relating to
employee benefit plans and not merely the laws purporting to regulate an area
expressly covered by ERISA. 44 For example, in Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
decision the court did not discuss an analagous trust law rule. See id. Under the general rule
regarding spendthrift trusts, creditors of the beneficiary of a spendthrift or protective trust may
not reach the assets of the trust to satisfy debts of the beneficiary until the beneficiary actually
receives such property from the trustee. See First Northwestern Trust Co. of S. Dak. v. I.R.S.,
622 F.d 387, 391 (8th Cir. 1980) (general rule protects funds held in spendthrift trust from creditors
of beneficiary even in bankruptcy proceedings); Roy v. Edgar, 11 Bankr. 853, 858 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 1981) (spendthrift trust does not restrain creditors from taking income or principal after
distribution); Kirk v. Kirk, 254 Or. 44, -, 456 P.2d 1009, 1010 (1969) (creditors may not
reach corpus of spendthrift trust unless creditor seeks amounts to satisfy child support or alimony
obligations).
39. 698 F.2d at 690-91. The IRC subjects an ERISA trust payout to taxation in the year
of distribution to the beneficiary. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(1), (2) (1976). Under IRC § 403(a)(4),
however, the IRS may not tax funds distributed from an ERISA account if within sixty days
of the distribution the beneficiary reinvests the distributed funds into another ERISA-qualified
plan. Id. at § 403(a)(4). Sweeney had argued that if funds had once composed part of an ERISA
trust, a creditor could never garnishee the funds even after distribution. See 698 F.2d at 690-91.
The Tenneco court did not explicitly state that the court would have adopted Sweency's view
if Sweeney had reinvested the proceeds in another ERISA account within sixty days. See id. The
court, however, did imply that Sweeney's argument would have been more persuasive if Sweeney
had reinvested the proceeds within the sixty day period. Id.
40. 698 F. 2d at 691.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 27-36 (Fourth Circuit's discussion of ERISA, tax
code, and tax regulations).
42. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976). Section 1144(a) states that the provisions of ERISA
supersede any and all state laws insofar as the state law relate to any employee benefit plan described
in 29 U.S.C § 1003(a). Id.; see id. § 1003(a). Section 1003(a) provides that ERISA covers any
employee benefit plan established or maintained by an employer engaged in commerce or in any
industry or actively affecting commerce or by an organization representing the employees engaged
in such activities. Id. § 1003(a). Section 1003(b), however, exempts from the operation of § 1003(a)
such benefit plans as governmental plans, church plans, plans maintained solely to comply with
workmen's compensation or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws, plans main-
tained outside of the United States for the benefit of alien persons, and unfunded excess benefit
plans. Id. § 1003(b).
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976) (ERISA preempts state laws regulating pension plans);
supra note 42 (discussion of ERISA's preemption provisions).
44. See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 77 (1st Cir.) (Congress intended to preempt
no only state laws regulating areas expressly covered by ERISA but also any state laws relating
to employee benefit plans), cert. denied 435 U.S. 980 (1977); Francis v. United Technologies
1984]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Barnes,45 the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held that ERISA preempted a California act regulating employee health benefit
plans. 46 The district court noted that Congress rejected early ERISA drafts
containing language limiting preemption in favor of more extensive preemp-
tion language.4 7 The court further found that the congressional debates revealed
that Congress intended to preempt all state action that interfered with the
federal regulation of private pension plans. 4 The Hewlett-Packard court con-
cluded that ERISA's legislative history and statutory language indicated that
Congress intended to preempt all state laws affecting employee benefit plans."9
Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (Congress intended to effect broadest possible preemp-
tion of state law); see also supra note 2 (Congress outlined several areas of concern existing before
ERISA); supra note 4 (purpose of ERISA is to provide retirement income for working people);
supra note 32 (passage of ERISA was in interest of beneficiaries and their dependents); infra
note 48 (remarks made on floor of House and Senate concerning ERISA's preemption provisions).
45. 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 831 (1978).
46. Id. at 1297.
47. Id. at 1298-99. See Boyle, Garnishment of Pension Benefits After ERISA, 34 Bus. LAw.
501, 510 (1979) (Congress rejected language limiting preemption in favor of present statute). An
early ERISA draft in the House of Representatives would have preempted only those state laws
relating to fiduciary duties, reporting standards, and disclosure requirements for persons acting
as plan trustees. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 114 (1973). Furthermore, an early Senate
draft of ERISA contained language that would have preempted only state laws relating to the
subject matters that the Act would regulate. See S.4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 60 (1973). Congress
eventually passed a provision stating that ERISA supersedes any and all state laws insofar as
the state law relates to any employee benefit plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976). But see infra
note 49 (some commentators do not interpret ERISA's preemption provisions as preempting all
state laws relating to employee benefit plans).
48. 425 F. Supp. at 1299-1300; see 120 CONG. REc. 29933 (1974) (remarks of Senator Har-
rison Williams, Jr.) (ERISA's provisions preempt all actions and laws of state governments in
use of pension benefits); id. at 29942 (remarks of Senator Jacob Javits) (ERISA preemption pro-
visions bar state action in area of employee benefit plans); id. at 29197 (remarks of Congressman
John Dent) (ERISA reserves to federal government sole power to regulate private employee benefit
plans).
49. 425 F. Supp. 1300. See Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 23, 38-43 (1978)
(statutory language and legislative history make clear that Congress intended that the federal
government alone should regulate employee benefit plans); Semo, ERISA Preemption: A Com-
parison of Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Services Corp. and Dawson v. Whaland,
3 J. OF PENSION PLAN. & Comp. 368, 369 (1977) (legislative history and language of ERISA in-
dicate Congress exercised full measure of constitutional power under commerce clause); see also
Boyle, supra note 47, at 509 (ERISA's assignment prohibition requirement creates general federal
exemption of pension benefits from creditor's claims and preempts relevant state law).
At least one commentator interprets ERISA's preemption provision language as refuting the
idea that Congress intended to preempt the entire field of pension plans for federal regulation.
See Reppy, Community and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social Security Benefits After
Marriage of Brown and ERISA, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 417, 515-16 (1978); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144 (1976) (ERISA's preemption provision). Section 1144(a) states that ERISA shall supersede
all state laws insofar as the laws relate to an employee benefit plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
Section 1144(c)(2) of ERISA defines "state" to include only those governmental instrumentalities
which regulate employee benefit plans. Id. § 1144(c)(2). Reppy interprets "regulate" to mean
that Congress intended the preemption provisions of § 1144(a) to have a limited effect because
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Although the Fourth Circuit did not make an explicit declaration of the
court's understanding of ERISA's preemption provision, the Tenneco court
implicitly decided that ERISA preempted certain state laws because the court
ruled that ERISA prohibits a judgment creditor from garnisheeing amounts
remaining in a pension plan.5 Like the Tenneco court, a majority of courts
have concluded that ERISA protects amounts remaining in the pension trustee's
possession.' For example, in the Sixth Circuit case of General Motors Corp.
v. Buha,5 2 the defendant Buha sued a married couple in a tort action and
obtained a state court judgment against the couple. 3 After the couple failed
to pay the judgment, Buha instituted post-judgment garnishment proceedings
against the couple's interest in an ERISA-qualified General Motors pension
a state law could have a possible effect on a pension plan but yet not attempt to regulate the
plan. Reppy, supra, at 515-16. One other commentator argues that despite the literal language
of ERISA's preemption provisions and the Congressional debates on preemption, Congress did
not intend to preempt all state and local laws that in any way apply to employee plans. See
Boyle, supra note 47, at 512. For an extreme example, Boyle cites that local building codes
presumably do not cease to apply to buildings owned by pension plans. Id.
Many courts, however, have held that ERISA preempts a wide range of state regulation
of employee benefit plans. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 711 (N.D.
Cal. 1977) (ERISA preempts state regulation of health plans), aff'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980)
aff'd 454 U.S. 801 (1981); Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp.
316, 321 (N.D. Ind.) (ERISA preempts state insurance law regulation of provisions of insurance-
like benefit plan), aff'd on other grounds, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977); Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (ERISA preempts state regulation of health
care service plans), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); Hurn
v. Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing, Heating & Piping Indus. of S. Cal., 424 F. Supp. 80,
82 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (ERISA's federally created cause of action preempts plan participant's state
law tort action); Azzaro v. Harnett, 414 F. Supp. 473, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (state insurance
superintendent enjoined from supervising ERISA plans), aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S .824 (1977). But see supra note 31 (implied exception for marital support payments
rests on public policy grounds).
50. See 698 F.2d at 690 (judgment creditor may not use writ of garnishment to reach amounts
in pension plan); see also infra text accompanying note 94 (Tenneco decision provides guidance
to Fourth Circuit practitioners and courts). But see supra note 31 (ERISA does not preempt
garnishment for family support payments).
51. See Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 526 F. Supp.
510, 516 (N.D. Tex 1981) (ERISA preempts state laws on garnishment); Goddard v. Boozer,
160 Ga. App. 303, 305, 287 S.E.2d 308, 309 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (ERISA precludes judgment
creditors from garnisheeing pension accounts); Christ Hosp. v. Greenwald, 82 Ill. App. 3d 1024,
1028, 403 N.E.2d 700, 704 (1980) (ERISA preempts state garnishment laws). Although some courts
have ruled that ERISA prohibits garnishment of pension benefits, many jurisdictions have explicitly
or impliedly assumed the existence of an ERISA prohibition on garnishment of pension benefits.
See Operating Eng'rs' Local No. 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196, 198 n.
2 (9th Cir. 1981) (assumed ERISA precludes garnishment); Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314, 315
(2d Cir. 1979) (garnishment of pension benefits for arrearages in wife and child support impliedly
excepted from general anti-alienation clause of ERISA); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry,
592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (former spouse seeking support payments may garnishee amounts
in ERISA pension fund); Seneco of Fla., Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902, 908 (M.D. Fla. 1979)
(ERISA does not preclude garnishment for family support obligations).
52. 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980).
53. Id. at 457.
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plan and served a writ of garnishment on the pension trustee.4 General Motors
filed an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan to block enforcement of Buha's'writ of garnishment." The district
court permanently enjoined Buha from garnisheeing the couple's interest in
the pension fund." On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that ERISA precludes
a judgment creditor from garnisheeing a beneficiary's interest in a qualified
pension plan. 7
The Sixth Circuit examined the language of ERISA's assignment and
alienation provision which prohibits all assignment and alienation of plan
benefits prior to distribution." The court noted that under a statutory excep-
tion to ERISA's assignment and alienation provision, a beneficiary may volun-
tarily and revocably assign up to ten percent of any benefit distribution plan. 9
Buha contended that the use of the words "alienation and assignment" to
describe acts prohibited under ERISA indicated that Congress intended to pro-
hibit only voluntary acts on the part of pension beneficiaries. 60 Buha argued
that Congress clearly had prohibited garnishments and attachments when Con-
gress intended to prevent involuntary assignments. 6' The defendant Buha argued
that in many statutes Congress has distinguished between voluntary assignments
and involuntary invasions of benefits by way of garnishment, execution, or
attachment.62 The Buha court recognized that Congress understood the dif-
ference between voluntary and involuntary encroachments of pension benefits
and that Congress had stated specifically that Congress intended to prohibit
both voluntary and involuntary encroachments on a pension fund.63 The Sixth
Circuit, however, noted that Congress used the word "voluntary" in specify-
ing the assignments that qualified for the ten percent exception. 6 The court
stated that the use of the word "voluntary" to describe the ten percent excep-




57. Id. at 463. Although the Sixth Circuit in Buha did not decide whether ERISA pro-
hibited garnishments of pension trusts to enforce family support obligations, the Buha court did
cite cases in which other courts found an implied exception allowing garnishment for marital
and child support payments. See id. at 460-61; see also supra note 31 (cases holding that ERISA
does not prohibit garnishment of pension benefits to enforce family support obligations).
58. 623 F.2d at 460; see 29 U.S.C. § 1056(dXl) (1976) (ERISA prohibits alienation and
assignment of pension benefits); see supra note 5 (ERISA's anti-assignment of alienation provision).
59. 623 F.2d at 460; see 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1976) (pensioner may voluntarily and
revocably assign 10% or less of any benefit payment); seesupra notes 5, 28 (discussion of ERISA
exception allowing voluntary and revocable assignment of 10% or less of any benefit payment).




64. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1976) (beneficiary may voluntarily and revocably assign
10% or less of any benefit payment); supra notes 5, 28 (discussion of ERISA exception allowing
voluntary and revocable assignment of 10% or less of any benefit payment).
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assignments included all encroachments, both voluntary and involuntary."
After examining the language of ERISA's assignment and alienation pro-
visions, the Sixth Circuit analyzed both the Treasury Department regulations
65. See 623 F.2d at 460. In addition to analyzing the ERISA statute and the Treasury Regula-
tions interpreting ERISA, the Buha court also examined a Joint Conference Committee Report
concerning ERISA but found the language too ambiguous to help the court reach any conclusion
on pension plan garnishments. See id.; H. R. REP No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 280, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 5038, 5061. The Joint Conference Report referred to
a general requirement of non-assignability. Id. The report noted the exception to non-assignability
contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) under which a beneficiary might voluntarily and revocably
assign 10% or less of any benefit payment. Id. The report then stated that the Committee did
not consider a garnishment or levy a voluntary assignment for purposes of "this rule." Id. In
Buha, General Motors argued that "this rule" referred to the statutory exception to the general
rule of non-assignability. 623 F.2d at 460. General Motors further asserted that since the Joint
Committee did not wish to allow garnishments within the 10% exception, ERISA also impliedly
disallowed garnishment above the 10% exception. Id. Buha, however, argued that "this rule"
referred to the general requirement of a provision against assignment, thus eliminating garnishments
from the category of assignments. Id. The Buha court held the language of the Joint Conference
Report too ambiguous to support either interpretation. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes
79-87 (IBEW court's discussion of legislative history).
In Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. Citizens Nat' Bank of Dallas, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas found unambiguous the Joint Conference Committee
Report language that for purposes of "this rule" a garnishment does not constitute a voluntary
assignment. 526 F. Supp. 510, 518 (N.D. Tex. 1981). The Commercial Mortgage court held that
the report only served to make clear that at no time could garnishments or levies constitute volun-
tary revocable assignments to qualify for the 10% exception to the general rule against assignments.
Id.
In addition to rejecting either interpretation given to the Joint Conference Report, the Buha
court chose not to rely on prior case law because previous decisions had reached different conclu-
sions on the question of pension plan garnishment. 623 F.2d at 460-61. The federal case decided
prior to Buha had construed ERISA to prohibit garnishments generally but found an exception
for wife and child support obligations. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d
118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (garnishment order used to satisfy court-ordered family support payments
impliedly excepted from alienation and assignment proscription of ERISA); Seneco of Fla., Inc.
v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902, 908 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (wife's post judgment garnishment of husband's
pension benefits pursuant to court support order not precluded by ERISA); Cody v. Riecker,
454 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (ERISA does not prevent enforcement of spousal sup-
port order against ERISA trust), aff'd, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); see supra note 5 (anti-assignment
and alienation provisions); supra note 31 (implied exception allowing garnishment for wife and
child support obligations). The state courts split on the question of whether ERISA prohibited
garnishment of pension benefits. Compare National Bank of N. Am. v. IBEW Local No. 3 Pen-
sion and Vacation Funds, 69 A.D.2d 679, 685-86, 419 N.Y.S. 2d 127, 131 (1979) (ERISA does
not prohibit garnishments), appeal dismissed, 48 N.Y.2d 752, 397 N.E.2d 1333, 422 N.Y.S.2d
666 (1979), with Electrical Workers, Local No. 1 Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust
Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154, 161-62 (Mo. 1979) (ERISA preempts rights of creditors to garnishee pen-
sion benefits). State courts recognize the validity of garnishments for family support obligations
without deciding whether a general prohibition on garnishment existed. See Western Elec. Co.
v. Traphagen, 166 N.J. Super. 418, 427, 400 A.2d 66, 69-70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)
(ERISA's general prohibition on garnishment does not apply when creditor attempts to collect
overdue family support obligations); Biles v. Biles, 163 N.J. Super. 49, 57, 394 A.2d 153, 156-57
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) (creditor collecting for past due family support may garnishee
pension fund in spite of ERISA's general prohibition on garnishment of benefit plans).
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concerning trusts qualified for special treatment under ERISA and the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. 66 The Treasury Regulations state that to qualify as an
ERISA trust, the terms of the trust must prohibit a creditor from garnishee-
ing, attaching, or alienating the pension funds or in any way subjecting the
funds to legal process to satisfy debts of a beneficiary. 6" The Sixth Circuit
held the regulation legislative in nature rather than interpretive 6 because ERISA
delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to issue regulations
concerning ERISA's participation, vesting, and funding standards. 69 When
Congress grants to the secretary of an executive department the primary respon-
sibility for clarifying a statutory term, the secretary promulgates regulations
with legislative effect. 70 The court also noted that Congress stated that the
Treasury's regulations concerning participation, vesting, and funding standards
of pension trusts would apply to the analagous portions of ERISA. 7 1 The Sixth
Circuit determined that the Treasury Regulation was not arbitrary or capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise unlawful 2 and thus held in accordance
with the regulation that ERISA required a general prohibition on garnish-
ment of pension benefits.
73
A minority of courts have not reached the same result as the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Tenneco and the Sixth Circuit in Buha.71 Courts adhering to the minority
view interpret the Joint Conference Committee Report on ERISA to indicate
66. See 623 F.2d at 462.
67. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1978) (interpreting the anti-assignment and aliena-
tion requirement of I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1976)); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1976) (qualified trust must
contain provision prohibiting alienation or assignment of pension benefits).
68. 623 F.2d at 462. Ordinarily, the courts will not defer to an administrative interpretation
of the terms of a statute. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424 (1977) (discussing judicial
deference given to administrative interpretations and regulations). In some situations, however,
Congress grants to the secretary of an executive department the primary responsibility for clarify-
ing a statutory term. See id. at 425. Under such authority, the secretary promulgates regulations
with legislative effect. See id. Reviewing courts may not freely set aside such regulations simply
because the court would have interpreted the statute in another manner. See id. The court must
follow the regulation unless the secretary exceeded his authority under the statute or the regula-
tion is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
See id. at 426; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (1976) (standard of review under Administrative Pro-
cedure Act). No general rule, however, requires a court to follow an interpretive regulation that
an agency issues without an express delegation of authority under the act to promulgate such
regulations. See 432 U.S. at 425 n.9. The courts defer to administrative interpretations in varying
degrees based upon such factors as the timing and nature of the position of the agency and the
nature of the agency's expertise. See id.
69. 623 F.2d at 462; see 29 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (1976) (Treasury Secretary has authority to
issue regulations concerning qualifying standards of ERISA).
70. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977) (regulations promulgated under specific
statutory grant have legislative effect).
71. 623 F.2d at 462; see 29 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (1976) (Treasury Regulations apply to ERISA
provisions).
72. 623 F.2d at 462-63 (citing Baker v. Otis Elevator Co., 609 F.2d 686, 691 (3d Cir. 1979)
(standard for following or rejecting quasi-legislative regulations)); see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)
(1976) (standard of review in Administrative Procedure Act); see also supra note 68 (standard
for determining whether to follow legislative regulation).
73. 623 F.2d at 463.
74. See National Bank of N. Am. v. IBEW Local No. 3 Pension and Vacation Funds,
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that Congress intended only to prevent voluntary assignments of more than
ten percent of the employee's benefits. 7" The Joint Conference Committee
Report first states ERISA's general rule of non-assignability which requires
a plan to provide that a beneficiary may not assign or alienate any benefits
under the plan. 6 The report next states an exception to the general rule of
non-assignability under which a beneficiary may voluntarily and revocably
assign ten percent or less of any benefit payment.77 Furthermore, the report
states that a garnishment or levy is not a voluntary assignment for purposes
of "this rule." 7 8
Like the minority of courts, the New York Supreme Court in National
Bank of North America v. IBEW Local No. 3 Pension and Vacation Funds79
has interpreted the Joint Conference Committee Report to express a Congres-
sional intent only to prevent voluntary assignments of more than ten percent
of pension distributions.8" In the IBEW case, the bank obtained a judgment
against Martin Conlon, a retired pensioner, and sought to have the judgment
satisfied out of Conlon's ERISA pension account with the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.8 The bank applied to the New York
Supreme Court for an order directing the pension trustee to satisfy the judg-
ment out of the monthly benefits the ERISA pension account paid to Conlon.2
The New York Supreme Court analyzed the Joint Conference Report inter-
preting ERISA's anti-alienation and assignment provisions to determine whether
ERISA allowed a judgment creditor to garnishee amounts remaining in a pen-
sion trust.8 3 Unlike the Buha court, the New York Supreme Court stated that
the report indicated that Congress only intended to prevent a voluntary disposi-
tion of more than ten percent of an employee's pension benefits.' The IBEW
court held that Congress did not place any restrictions on involuntary disposi-
69 A.D.2d 679, 686, 419 N.Y.S. 2d 127, 131 (1979) (ERISA's preemption provisions have no
effect on state garnishment law), appeal dismissed, 48 N.Y.S.2d 752, 397 N.E.2d 1333, 422 N.Y.S.2d
666 (1979); Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp. v. Bank of N.Y., 102 Misc. 2d 235, 236, 425 N.Y.S.
2d 908, 908 (N.Y. App. Term. 1979) (state law on garnishment still effective as to pension funds
after ERISA); see also Lowery v. Spector, 77 A.D.2d 813, 813, 430 N.Y.S. 2d 767, 767-68 (1980)
(ERISA does not preclude levy on pension funds once trust has terminated).
75. See Note, Attachment of Pension Benefits Under ERISA, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 255,
263 (1979) (one view reads Joint Conference Report's definition of voluntary assignment to mean
that ERISA only prevents voluntary assignments of more than 10%) [hereinafter cited as Attach-
ment]; see also H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 280, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5038, 5061.
76. See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 280, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5038, 5061.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. 93 Misc. 2d 590, 400 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977), aff'd, 69 A.D. 2d 679, 419
N.Y.S.2d 127 (1979), appeal dismissed, 48 N.Y. 2d 752, 397 N.E.2d 1333, 422 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1979).
80. See id. at 597, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
81. See id. at 591, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
82. See id., 400 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
83. See id. at 596-97, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 486-87; H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
280, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5061 (committee's interpretation
of ERISA's anti-assignment and alienation provisions).
84. See 93 Misc. 2d at 598, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
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tions of pension benefits."5 The IBEW court reasoned that since the Joint Con-
ference Report recognized that garnishment is not a voluntary assignment,
Congress did not intend the voluntary assignment exception's limitation of
ten percent to apply to garnishments." The court, therefore, concluded that
although ERISA prohibited voluntary assignments above ten percent, ERISA
placed no limitations whatsoever on involuntary assignments effected under
the New York garnishment law.
8 7
Several reasons exist for rejecting the IBEW court's conclusion that ERISA
does not prohibit garnishment of pension accounts.88 Unlike the IBEW court,
a majority of the courts construe the Joint Conference Report to mean that
ERISA prohibits all assignments and alienations, both voluntary and involun-
tary, with but one exception for voluntary and revocable assignments of up
to ten percent.8 9 The majority approach appears more reasonable from a literal
reading of the Joint Conference Report, even though the reference to gar-
nishments and levies as not being voluntary assignments seems superfluous.98
The majority view prohibiting all garnishments also appears consistent with
the stated Congressional goal of ensuring that the employee's accrued benefits
actually would be available for retirement purposes.9 Moreover, the Treasury
Regulation's extension of the prohibition on alienation and assignment to all
encroachments on a pension fund whether voluntary or compulsory supports
the majority interpretation of the ERISA anti-assignment provision.9 2 The
United States Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that a court should follow
Treasury Regulations unless the court finds the regulations unreasonable and
plainly inconsistent with the statute.93
85. See id., 400 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
86. See id. at 597, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
87. See id., 400 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
88. See Boyle, supra note 47, at 506 (criticizing IBEW decision and stating that cases which
hold that assignment-prohibition requirement applies to involuntary assignments reach better result);
Note, Attachment, supra note 75, at 264 (ERISA prohibits all assignments and alienations except
for 10% voluntary assignment exception).
89. See Note, Attachment, supra note 75, at 264 (majority of courts have concluded that
ERISA prohibits all assignments whether voluntary or involuntary).
90. See id. (literal reading of Joint Conference Committee Report supports view that ERISA
prohibits all alienations and assignments whether voluntary or compulsory); H.R. REP. No. 1280,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 280, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5038, 5061 (ERISA
prohibits alienation and assignment of pension benefits); cf. supra text accompanying notes 79-87
(IBEW court's analysis of Joint Conference Committee Report).
91. See Note, Attachment, supra note 75, at 264 (prohibiting all garnishments appears con-
sistent with Congressional intent and purposes); H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 68,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4670, 4734 (anti-assignment provision ensures
that pension benefits remain available for retirement).
92. See Boyle, supra note 47, at 505 (Treasury Regulations support view that ERISA pro-
hibits all garnishments); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1978) (ERISA prohibits garnishments
of pension benefits); supra text accompanying notes 66-73 (Sixth Circuit's analysis in Buha of
Treasury Regulations on ERISA).
93. See Boyle, supra note 47, at 505 (courts should follow Treasury Regulations unless
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The Tenneco decision provides guidance to the Fourth Circuit practitioners
and courts because the holding clearly precludes judgment creditors from gar-
nisheeing pension benefits that remain in the control of a pension trustee.
94
The majority of courts support the result reached by the Tenneco court."5
Examination of the preemption provisions of ERISA compels the conclusion
that the Fourth Circuit reached the correct result in Tenneco because Con-
gress intended to establish a uniform body of pension lav throughout the
United States. 96 A logical interpretation of the Joint Conference Report on
ERISA 7 and a literal reading of the Treasury Regulations explaining the anti-
assignment provisions also support the Fourth Circuit's decision.9 8 Tenneco
upholds the Congressional purpose behind ERISA of ensuring that an
employee's pension benefits remain undisturbed and available for an employee's
retirement years.99
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unreasonable); see also Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (courts should
not invalidate Treasury Regulations except for weighty reasons), reh'g denied, 334 U.S. 813 (1948);
Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 336 (1930) (interpretation given to statute by those charged with
statute's administration will not be overruled except for weighty reasons).
94. 698 F.2d at 690. Although the Fourth Circuit in Tenneco did establish a clear rule
that precluded garnishment of pension accounts, the court did not decide whether the Fourth
Circuit would recognize a judicially created exception allowing garnishment for family support
payments. Id. The court, however, did cite approvingly to the cases finding an implied exception
to the prohibition on garnishment for family support obligations. Id.; see supra note 31 (discus-
sion of judicially implied exception allowing garnishment of pension benefits to satisfy marital
support obligations).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 51-73 (discussion of cases reaching same result as
Fourth Circuit in Tenneco).
96. See Note, Attachment, supra note 75, at 275 (guiding purpose of preemption clause
was to provide uniform regulation of pension plans); H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
17, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs 4639, 4655 (purpose of ERISA's preemption
clause is to eliminate inconsistent local regulation); see also supra text accompanying notes 41-49
(Congress intended to preempt area of employee pension plans for federal regulation).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90 (logical reading of Joint Conference Report
supports majority view that ERISA prohibits all garnishments); H.R. RaP. No. 1280, 93d CoNG.,
2d Sass. 280, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5038, 5061 (ERISA prohibits
alienation and assignment of pension benefits); see also Tenneco, Inc. v. First Va. Bank of
Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688, 690 (4th Cir. 1983) (legislative history shows that Congress precluded
garnishments); Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 526 F. Supp.
510, 518 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (Joint Conference Report indicates ERISA prohibits garnishments).
The Commercial Mortgage court stated that the only reasonable reading of both ERISA and
the Internal Revenue Code and all the legislative history indicates that the assignment-alienation
prohibition extends to involuntary assignments such as garnishments. 526 F. Supp. at 518; cf.
supra note 65 (Sixth Circuit in Buha found legislative history ambiguous).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 66-73 (Treasury Regulations support view that ERISA
precludes garnishment of pension funds).
99. See supra text accompanying note 2 (congressional purposes behind ERISA); supra text
accompanying note 4 (ERISA intended to protect pension fund until pensioner's retirement).
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B. Interpreting the Good Faith Clause in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
Proceedings: A Middle Road Approach
In 1978 Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act' (Act) pursuant to
Article I of the United States Constitution.2 Chapter 131 of the Act addresses
financial problems of persons with a regular income who voluntarily initiate
bankruptcy proceedings.' Congress designed chapter 13 to assist both debtors
and creditors in financial dealings.- Chapter 13 benefits debtors by providing
a mechanism which allows individuals with a regular income6 to pay off their
debts so that these individuals achieve a fresh start with no financial
obligations.7 At the same time, chapter 13 protects creditors' rights by pro-
viding a system of debt repayment designed to ensure that courts treat creditors
fairly.'
Chapter 13 established a particular procedure that a debtor must follow
when filing for bankruptcy.9 First, the debtor must file a proposal for a debt
repayment plan with the Bankruptcy Court.'" If the plan satisfies the six re-
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (Supp.
V 1981)).
2. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Article I of the Constitution states that Congress can
establish uniform laws on bankruptcies. Id. The drafters of the Constitution granted Congress
the power to eliminate the inconsistencies that plagued debtor-creditor relationships in the col-
onies during the middle of the eighteenth century. See P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDIToRs
IN AmERICA (1974), 16-17; Inconsistencies existed in debt collection because some states had
bankruptcy laws while others did not, and the way each state administered their bankruptcy laws
affected the business success of anyone engaged in interstate business. Id.
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (Supp. V 1981).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. V 1981); see H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 120
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6068. The legislative history states
that Congress intended chapter 13 proceedings to be completely voluntary. Id.
5. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (legislative history of chapter 13 shows
congressional intent of assisting both debtors and creditors).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (24) (Supp. V 1981). Section 101 (24) defines "individual with regular
income" as a person who has a stable and regular income such that the individual can make
payments under a chapter 13 repayment plan. Id.
7. See H.R. RaP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6079. The legislative history states that Congress established a policy
goal of having debtors become contributing members in society once their financial debts are
repaid. Id.; see infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussion of congressional purpose of
designing chapter 13 to provide debtors with a fresh start).
8. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6079; see infra note 85 and accompanying text (discussion of congres-
sional intent to protect creditors' rights).
9. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1325 (Supp. V 1981); see infra text accompanying notes 10-12 (pro-
cedure that debtor must follow in chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings).
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301 & 1322 (Supp. V 1981). The debtor must have less than $100,000
in unsecured debts, and less than $350,000 in secured debts to qualify for chapter 13 relief. Id.
§ 109(e). The debtor's plan does not have to provide for immediate repayment of debts. Id.
§ 1322(c). Rather, the debtor's repayment plan can provide for payments to a trustee over a
three to five year period. Id.
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quirements in section 1325 of chapter 13," the Bankruptcy Court must con-
firm the proposed plan.' 2 One requirement of section 1325 is that the debtor
must propose the plan in "good faith."' 3 Generally, courts have not agreed
on how to interpret good faith.'4 In Deans v. O'Donnell,'5 the Fourth Circuit
examined the good faith requirement of section 1325(a)(3), and held that good
faith did not require that a proposed payment plan provide for a meaningful
or substantial repayment to unsecured creditors.' 6
In Deans, Margaret Ann Deans submitted a proposed repayment plan to
the Bankruptcy Court which called for thirty-six monthly payments of 120.42
dollars to a trustee.' 7 Deans' plan provided for full payment to secured
creditors, but the plan specifically stated that Deans' unsecured creditors would
not receive any payments.' 8 The Bankruptcy Court rejected the repayment
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (Supp. V 1981):
(a) The court shall confirm a plan if-
(1) The plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with other applicable provi-
sions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28, or by the plan,
to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under
the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would
be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title
on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for the plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B) (i) the plan provides that the holder of such retain the lien securing such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed
under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; or
(iii) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder; and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and comply with the plan.
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (Supp. V 1981). The Act clearly states that a court must con-
firm a debtor's plan if the plan meets all six requirements of § 1325. Id.; see, e.g., In re Ruiz,
4 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2D (MB) 1359, 1360 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (confirmation of plan that
meets minimum standards specified in § 1325 is responsibility of court); In re Melroy, 3 COLLIER
BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 864, 866 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1980) (repayment plan must meet all six re-
quirements of § 1325 before court can confirm plan); In re Webb, I COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D
(MB) 465, 466 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980) (court properly confirmed plan that satisfied confirma-
tion criteria of § 1325).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981); see supra note 11 (text of § 1325(a)(3)).
14. See In re Heard, 6 Bankr. 876, 878 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (courts have inconsistently inter-
preted good faith clause); Hughes, Chapter 13's Potential for Abuse, 58 N.C.L. REv. 831, 849
(1980) (good faith interpretation has created more disagreement among courts than any issue
in Bankruptcy Code); see infra notes 39-70 and accompanying text (discussion of different ap-
proaches courts use in interpreting good faith).
15. 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982).
16. Id. at 969-70.
17. 14 Bankr. 997 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981). The petitioner Deans indicated she had a take
home pay of $862 per month. Id. Deans listed her expenses as $733 per month which left her
with a surplus of $129. Id. at 998.
18. Id. at 997; 692 F.2d at 969. Deans owed $6,913 to a secured creditor. Id. An automobile
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plan on the grounds that Deans did not propose the plan in good faith.' 9 The
Bankruptcy Court ruled that a repayment plan which does not provide substan-
tial and meaningful repayments to unsecured creditors cannot qualify under
the good faith test as a matter of law.2" Deans appealed, and the district court
affirmed the Bankruptcy Court ruling.2" The district court agreed with the
Bankruptcy Court that Deans had not proposed the plan in good faith since
the plan provided no repayment to unsecured creditors.22 In evaluating good
faith, neither the Bankruptcy Court nor the district court looked beyond the
fact that the plan contained no arrangement for payments to unsecured
creditors.
2 3
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Deans contended that the method of
interpreting good faith advocated by the district court was arbitrary since the
only factor the district court examined when determining good faith was the
amount of the payment to unsecured creditors.2" The trustee opposing the
repayment plan contended that a plan proposing no payment to unsecured
creditors was per se "bad faith" since failure to provide payment would not
benefit creditors and would ignore the chapter 13 goal of protecting creditors'
rights.2 The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected the per se argument that a good
secured $3,625 of the $6,913 debt. Id. Deans owned $4,013 to her unsecured creditors. Id. Deans
repayment plan proposed that none of the debts owed to the unsecured creditors would be repaid.
Id.
19. 14 Bankr. at 998.
20. Id. at 1000.
21. Id. The district court stated that since Deans could not use chapter 13 because she
had proposed a per se bad faith plan, Deans must file for bankruptcy under chapter 7 liquida-
tion. Id. A major difference between chapter 7 and chapter 13 is the broad discharge granted
by chapter 13 cancelling the debtor's financial obligations. See Note, Chapter 13 De Minimus
Plans: Toward a Consensus on "Good Faith," 9 HoFsTRA L. Rav. 593, 606 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Consensus] (broad scope of discharge under chapter 13 as compared to narrower discharge
under chapter 7 is one of most attractive features of chapter 13 relief). The court can deny a
discharge under chapter 7 for several reasons including either the fact that the debtor received
a prior discharge or the debtor acted dishonestly in the proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (Supp.
V 1981). Conversely, chapter 13 only denies the debtor a discharge for a limited number of reasons
such as the fact that the debtor fraudulently obtained the discharge. Id. § 1328. Another major
difference between chapter 13 and chapter 7 is that chapter 7 requires a debtor to liquidate his
assets in an effort to repay debts. Id. §§ 701-728. Chapter 13, however, provides that a debtor
repay his creditors out of future income. Id. §§ 1301-1330.
22. 14 Bankr. at 998-1000. In Deans, the district and bankruptcy courts' method of inter-
preting good faith precludes the debtor from using chapter 13 unless the debtor can propose
a plan which provides for substantial repayment. Id. at 999-1000. Other courts also have held
that a plan must propose substantial payments. See, e.g., In re Weissinger, 5 COLLIER BANKR.
CAs. 2D (MB) 328, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (chapter 13 plan proposing no payments to unsecured
creditors is per se bad faith); In the Matter of Hurd, 3 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2D (MB) 303, 305
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1980) (chapter 13 plan not providing payment for creditors not good faith);
In re Campbell, 1 COLLIER B.rANK. CAs. 2D (MB) 653, 654 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (payment
must be substantial to satisfy chapter 13 good faith); see also infra notes 55-65 (discussion of
courts' reasoning underlying substantial repayment approach); infra notes 66-70 (recent trend
rejects substantial repayment requirement).
23. 692 F.2d at 972.
24. Id. at 968; 14 Bankr. at 998.
25. 692 F.2d at 969-70.
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faith plan must provide substantial and meaningful repayment to unsecured
creditors.26 Instead, the Fourth Circuit held that courts must determine good
faith in chapter 13 bankruptcy cases on a case by case basis.
27
The Deans court began the analysis of whether Deans proposed the repay-
ment plan in good faith by examining the legislative history of chapter 13.28
The Fourth Circuit discovered no clear definition of good faith in the legislative
history.2 9 The court noted that although the legislative history suggests that
plans should propose full repayment of debts whenever possible, the legislative
history does not indicate that good faith requires a particular level of pay-
ment to every unsecured creditor.30
In examining the legislative history, the Deans court also noted that Con-
gress could have created a statutory requirement that a repayment plan pro-
vide substantial payments to unsecured creditors. 3 The Fourth Circuit,
however, found that Congress did not include substantial repayment as one
of the chapter 13 confirmation requirements in section 1325.32 The Deans court
subsequently refused to insert the requirement of substantial repayment into
the statute.3 3 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the function of the court is
to interpret and construe statutes, not to write statutes . 3 The Fourth Circuit
26. Id. at 970.
27. Id. at 972.
28. Id. at 969-71; see infra notes 29-35 & 80-86 (discussion of legislative history of chapter 13).
29. 692 F.2d at 971; see H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123-25 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6084-86. The legislative history of chapter 13 con-
cerning the confirmation of a debtor's proposed repayment plan does not expressly define good
faith. Id. The legislative history shows that Congress intended that debtors and creditors be treated
equally under chapter 13. Id. at 124; see infra notes 89-96 (congressional attempts to amend
good faith section of chapter 13 demonstrate congressional interpretation of good faith).
30. 692 F.2d at 971. Although Congress discussed the amount of repayment to creditors,
Congress did not discuss good faith in the context of the amount of repayment. H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963,
6079. Congress recognized that some plans will call for full payment while other plans may only
offer the creditor a percentage of their claims. Id. No reference is made to any requirement of
a specific percentage of repayment to creditors. Id.; see infra note 83 and accompanying text
(examination of legislative history shows no indication that good faith meant substantial repayment).
31. 692 F.2d at 970.
32. Id. at 970. H.R. RP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118-25 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6079-86.
33. 692 F.2d at 971. The Fourth Circuit in Deans noted that injecting a requirement of
substantial repayment into every proposed plan did not coincide with the congressional intent
of expanding the scope of chapter 13. Id.; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 141, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5927.
34. 692 F.2d at 971-72. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Congress, rather than the courts,
has the authority to amend chapter 13 requirements. Id.; see Hanover Bank v. Commissioner,
369 U.S. 672, 678-88 (1961). The Hanover Court held that the Supreme Court cannot interpret
the meaning of statutory language so as to effect a purpose that does not appear on the face
of the statute. Id. at 687. The Supreme Court noted that the legislature has the authority to
change the statute. Id. at 688; see Maat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966) (courts should
use ordinary and usual meaning of words when interpreting statutory language); United States
v. Freeman, 473 F.2d 7, 9 (8th Cir. 1973) (intent of Congress should be gleaned from plain and
ordinary meaning of language in statute); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
431 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir. 1970) (court would be exceeding judicial function by impinging on
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further noted that a definition of good faith that would apply to every situa-
tion is not practical because no one factor is always determinative of good
faith.
35
Although no single factor is determinative of good faith, the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated that a debtor's failure to provide substantial repayment to unsecured
creditors is a factor courts may consider in making the good faith
determination. 36 The Deans court stated that a plan proposing no payments
to unsecured creditors can be evidence that a debtor is attempting to manipulate
the statute so that the debtor will not have to repay debts." The Fourth Cir-
cuit concluded, however, that a court must consider all the circumstances of
each proposed repayment plan on a case by case basis in determining whether
the debtor proposed the plan in good faith.
38
In interpreting good faith, the Fourth Court in Deans applied one of the
three basic methods that exist for determining the meaning of good faith under
section 1325(a)(3). 39 Under the first method, characterized as the "low road"
approach, courts determine that a plan is proposed in good faith when the
plan meets the substantive requirement of section 1325(a)(4).4" The substan-
tive requirement in section 1325(a)(4) requires that the creditor receive more
under the debtor's proposed chapter 13 plan than he would receive if the deb-
tor used chapter 7 liquidation." The low road approach therefore requires
confirmation of repayment plans if the creditor receives more under the debtor's
plan than the creditor would receive if the debtor had filed under chapter
7.42 A second method courts use in determining good faith is the "high road"
legislative authority if court rewrote statute); see also infra notes 77-79 (explanation of historical-
ly accepted meaning of good faith).
35. 692 F.2d at 972; see infra notes 105-111 and accompanying text (no one factor is deter-
minative of good faith).
36. 692 F.2d at 972; see infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text and text accompanying
notes 107-111 (amount of repayment to unsecured creditors is only one factor courts should con-
sider in determining whether debtor proposed plan in good faith).
37. 692 F.2d at 972.
38. Id.
39. See infra notes 40-58 (discussion of three basic approaches courts use to determine good
faith).
40. See infra note 42 (examples of courts that use low road approach). The "low road"
test for determining good faith requires courts to confirm a plan if the road demonstrates that
the creditor will. get more under the proposed chapter 13 plan than the creditor would receive
under a chapter 7 liquidation plan. Flygare v. Boulden, 709 F.2d 1344, 1347 (10th Cir. 1983).
A congressional commission investigating the bankruptcy laws noted that since the typical con-
sumer debtor has no assets that are not exempt from being liquidated and sold to repay creditors
under chapter 7 rules, the creditor would not receive any payment in the typical chapter 7 liquida-
tion proceeding. See REPORT ON THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 197, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess., pt. I, 65 (1973), reprinted in App. 2 COLLIER
ON BANKRc. (15th ed. 1980). Thus, if the creditor receives anything under the proposed chapter
13 plan, that amount would always be more than the creditor would receive under chapter 7. Id.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
42. See, e.g., In re Erwin, 4 COLLER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 174, 177 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1981) (court can confirm plan if plan satisfies § 1325(a)(4)); In re Harland, 3 Bankr. 597, 598-99
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1980) (plan providing no payments is not per se bad faith if plan passes § 1325(a)(4)
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approach. 3 The high road approach, rejected by the Fourth Circuit in Deans,
holds that good faith is satisfied only if the repayment plan proposes substan-
tial or meaningful repayments to unsecured creditors." A third method, which
the Fourth Circuit adopted in Deans, is the "middle road" approach."5 The
middle road approach requires courts to examine all of the factors of a pro-
posed repayment plan when determining good faith.4" Thus, the middle road
approach calls for a case by case examination in order to determine good faith.
4 7
In contrast to the middle road approach which determines good faith on
a case by case basis, the low road approach renders the good faith require- "
ment of section 1325(a)(3) meaningless. 8 The good faith clause is meaningless
under the low road approach because a low road court will always find that
the debtor has satisfied the good faith requirement of section 1325(a)(3) if
the plan meets the substantive requirement of section 1325(a)(4).4 9 The
legislative history, however, demonstrates that a proposed repayment plan must
pass both the section (a)(4) requirement and an independent determination
that the debtor proposed the plan in good faith. 0 Thus, the low road ap-
test); In re Powell, I CoLLER BANKR. CAs. 2D. (MB) 371, 373 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980) (court
can confirm chapter 13 repayment plan once debtor meets § 1325(a)(4) substantive requirement).
43. See In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885, 888 (11th Cir. 1983) (court termed method of inter-
preting good faith that emphasizes substantial repayment to unsecured creditors "high road"
approach); infra text accompanying notes 44, 53-58 (discussion of high road or substantial repay-
ment approach of good faith).
44. See, e.g., In re Koerperich, 3 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2D (MB) 923, 924 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1981) (chapter 13 plan providing no payments to unsecured creditors is not proposed in good
faith); In re Melroy, 3 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2D (MB) 864, 867 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1980) (chapter
13 plan must provide meaningful payment to unsecured creditors before court can confirm); In
re Seman, 2 COLLIER BAN KR. CAs. 2D (MB) 394, 398 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1980) (court cannot
confirm plan providing no substantial payments to unsecured creditors).
45. See In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d at 888. The Kitchens court noted that there are three methods
for determining good faith. Id. The Eleventh Circuit in Kitchens referred to the totality of the
circumstances approach that Deans advocated as the "middle road" approach. Id.; see also infra
notes 66-70 (discussion of other circuits' adoption of middle road approach to determine good faith).
46. See infra note 68 (courts using middle road approach examine all circumstances of plan
before deciding whether to confirm or deny plan).
47. See infra notes 66-70 (middle road approach uses case by case examination to deter-
mine good faith).
48. See In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 1981). The Rimgale court held that
courts may not confirm a proposed plan simply because the plan meets the requirements of §
1325(a)(4). Id. at 431. The Rimgale court stated that to confirm a plan simply because the plan
satisfies the requirement of § 1325(a)(4) ignores the good faith requirement of § 1325(a)(3). Id.;
see also Consensus, supra note 21, at 610. The Consensus article stated that a court misinterprets
the good faith requirement when that court ratifies a plan based solely on the fact that the pro-
posed repayment plan would pay the creditor more than he would receive under chapter 7
liquidation. Id.
49. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (low road courts will confirm plan if plan
satisfies § 1325(a)(4)); supra note 48 (Rimgale court noted low road courts ignore good faith
requirement by allowing § 1325(a)(4) to be determinative of confirmation); supra notes 11-12
(statute clearly states that plan must meet both § 1325(a)(3) and § 1325(a)(4) requirements before
confirmation can occur); infra note 50 and accompanying text (legislative history states that repay-
ment plans must meet both § 1325(a)(3) and § 1325(a)(4) requirements).
50. See S. RP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 142, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
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proach is unsound because the low road approach fails to determine whether
a proposed repayment plan satisfies the independent requirement of section
1325(a)(3).'
In contrast to the low road approach, the high road approach holds that
a proposed plan must provide for substantial repayment to unsecured creditors
to satisfy the good faith requirement.2 The leading case in the high road ap-
proach is In re lacovoni. 3 In Iacovoni, the district court for the District of
Utah held that a failure to provide substantial repayments to unsecured creditors
was per se bad faith.-4 The lacovoni court based its holding on an examina-
tion of the legislative history of chapter 13.11 The lacovoni court found that
the congressional intent underlying the enactment of chapter 13 was to pro-
vide a mechanism enabling debtors to repay their debts and to protect creditors'
rights.56 The lacovoni court, therefore, held that plans providing no substan-
tial repayments to unsecured creditors were contrary to congressional intent
and consequently failed to meet chapter 13 confirmation requirements."7 Other
courts have cited and followed the reasoning of lacovoni in holding that a
substantial repayment to unsecured creditors is a prerequisite to a good faith
finding.58
& AD. NEWS 5787, 5928. The legislative history clearly indicates that courts must determine that
repayment plans satisfy both the good faith clause and the § 1324(a)(4) test before confirming
a repayment plan. Id.; see also 126 CONG. REC. H9305 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1980) (remarks of
Rep. Hyde) (Rep. Hyde stated that Congress did not intend courts to confirm plan which only
meets minimum requirements of § 1325(a)(4)).
51. See supra notes 48-50 (demonstration that low road approach is not correct).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 22 & 44 (courts that use high road approach require
substantial repayment to unsecured creditors before court can confirm plan); see also In re Kit-
chens, 702 F.2d 885, 888 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussion of high road approach).
53. 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980); see Note, "Good Faith" and Confirmation of
Chapter 13 Composition Plans: Analysis and a Proposal, 65 MINN. L. Rnv. 659, 665 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Composition] (In re lacovoni is leading case using high road approach to
deny confirmation of plans that do not provide substantial debt repayment to unsecured creditors);
but see also infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (Tenth Circuit in Flygare overruled Iacovont).
54. 2 Bankr. at 258-59. In facovoni, the district court considered eight separate plans that
proposed no repayment to unsecured creditors. Id.
55. Id. at 263; see REPORT ON THE COMMISSION OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 197, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess., pt. I, 157-59 (1973), reprinted in App. 2 CoL-
LIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. 1980) (one major purpose of consumer bankruptcy system is to
assist individual debtors in repaying debts).
56. 2 Bankr. at 263; see REPORT ON THE COMMISSION OF THE BANRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 197, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess., pt. I, 157-59 (1973), reprinted in
App. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. 1980). The commission report states that debtors should
be encouraged to repay debts. Id. at 157. The report states, however, that there is no requirement
that a debtor pay all of his debts. Id. at 159-60. Conversely, the commission report also notes
that consumer bankruptcy provisions should protect creditors rights. Id. at 163. The report made
no specific recommendations on how to protect creditors' rights. Id.
57. 2 Bankr. at 262. The lacovoni court stated that a plan providing no repayment to
unsecured creditors renders chapter 13 meaningless because confirming such a plan violated the
concept in chapter 13 of protecting creditors. Id.
58. See, e.g., In re Levine, 10 Bankr. 168, 170 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (chapter 13 benefits
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Three years after the district court decided lacovoni, the Tenth Circuit
in Flygare v. Boulden considered the issue of how to interpret the good faith
clause of section 1325(a)(3)." The Flygare court held that the high road ap-
proach is not the proper test to apply when determining good faith.60 The
Flygare court therefore overruled Iacovoni and the high road test.6 ' The Flygare
court also rejected the low road approach 62 and decided instead to adopt the
middle road approach. 63 The Flygare court cited the Deans' court analysis
as the correct method for determining good faith. 6 The Flygare court em-
phasized that the middle road approach advocated by Deans requires courts
to consider all the factors and circumstances of a particular proposed plan
before determining whether the debtor proposed the plan in good faith. 6
The middle road approach advocated by Flygare and Deans has received
wide approval from other circuits. 66 Of the twelve circuits, eight have ruled
on the question of how to determine good faith in a chapter 13 proceeding.
67
All eight circuits, while using different language, have adopted the middle
road approach." Two of the eight circuits expressly cited the Fourth Circuit's
require debtor to make more than nominal payments to unsecured creditors); In re Smith, 8
Bankr. 543, 548 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (proposal of relatively small repayment demonstrated
that debtor did not offer plan in good faith); In re Johnson, 5 Bankr. 40, 42 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1980) (legislative purpose underlying chapter 13 was that all repayment plans should provide substan-
tial or meaningful repayment of unsecured claims); In re Bloom, 3 Bankr. 467, 470 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1980) (confirming chapter 13 plans that called for no repayments to unsecured creditors
destroyed purpose of having debtors repay debts).
59. 709 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir. 1983).
60. Id. at 1347-48. The Flygare court expressly adopted the middle road approach advocated
by Deans. Id. at 1347. The Flygare court also expressly stated that courts should follow the Fourth
Circuit's analysis in Deans to determine if the proposed repayment plan constitutes an abuse
of the "spirit" of chapter 13. Id.
61. Id. at 1347-48. The Jacovoni court held that good faith, as a matter of law, meant
substantial and meaningful repayment to unsecured creditors. 2 Bankr. at 262. The Tenth Circuit
in Flygare, which controls the district court that decided lacovoni, expressly rejected lacovoni's
per se requirement of substantial repayment. 709 F.2d at 1347. Instead, the Tenth Circuit adopted
the middle road approach. Id. Though the Tenth Circuit in Flygare did not expressly overrule
Jacovoni, Flygare's rejection of Iacovoni's per se requirement implicitly overrules 'Iacovoni. Id.
Since Jacovoni was the central case that courts using the high road approach followed, the im-
plicit overruling of facovoni weakens the validity of the high road approach. See supra note
59 (cases following reasoning of Iacovoni).
62. 709 F.2d at 1347. The Flygare court rejected the low road approach, reasoning that
the low road approach ignored the good faith requirement. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. The Flygare court found the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Deans persuasive
in reaching the conclusion that a court must determine good faith based on the totality of the
circumstances surrounding a proposed repayment plan. Id.
65. 709 F.2d at 1347; see infra notes 107-110 (discussion of factors courts should consider
when making good faith determination).
66. See infra note 68 (list of circuits that have adopted middle road approach).
67. See infra note 68 (list of eight circuits that have adopted middle road approach). All
circuits except the First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth have ruled on good faith.
68. See infra text accompanying note 97 (uniformity currently exists among circuits regard-
ing interpretation of good faith). The eight circuit courts that have addressed the question of
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reasoning in Deans as persuasive when deciding to adopt the middle road
approach."0 This uniform adoption of the middle road approach represents
a change in the previous inconsistent methods courts used in interpreting good
faith.
70
how to interpret good faith have adopted the middle road approach. The Second Circuit addressed
the good faith issue in In re Johnson and ruled that the per se good faith requirement of substan-
tial repayment is incorrect. 708 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1983). The Johnson court cited Deans
with approval and noted that a court must examine all the factors of a particular plan in making
the good faith determination. Id. The Johnson court also noted that good faith requires the deb-
tor to be honest in presenting the circumstances of his plan. Id.
The Seventh Circuit examined the good faith issue in In re Rimgale and rejected the low
road approach in holding that a court should not confirm a plan simply because the plan meets
the requirement of § 1325(a)(4). 669 F.2d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 1982). In addition, the Rimgale
court rejected the high road approach of a per se minimum repayment requirement. Id. at 432.
The Rimgale court adopted the middle road approach, holding that courts must examine the
factors of each particular case to ascertain good faith. Id. The Rimgale court noted that one
factor middle road courts should consider is whether a proposed plan "abuses the spirit" of
chapter 13. Id.
The Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of good faith in In re Estus and noted that the under-
lying purpose of chapter 13 was to establish a flexible system providing effective relief for con-
sumer debtors and encouraging consumer debtors to pay off their debts. 695 F.2d 311, 313 (8th
Cir. 1982). The Estus court held that a per se minimum payment requirement would infringe
on the desired flexibility of chapter 13. Id. at 316. The Estus court concluded that a court must
examine all the circumstances of a particular plan. Id. at 316-17.
The Ninth Circuit confronted the good faith issue in In re Goeb and refused to insert a
strict substantive requirement demanding a certain level of repayment to unsecured creditors into
the good faith clause of § 1325(a)(3). 675 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1982). The Goeb court ruled
that the proper approach is to determine good faith on a case by case basis by examining the
particular features of each proposed repayment plan. Id. at 1390. The Goeb court noted that
nominal repayment is only one factor to consider in determining good faith. Id. The Ninth Cir-
cuit also addressed the good faith issue in In the Matter of Gregory, and again held that courts
should determine good faith by examining all of the factors in a particular case. 705 F.2d 1118,
1120 (9th Cir. 1983). The Gregory case stated that after examining all of the relevant factors,
courts could confirm a plan that proposes only nominal payments to unsecured creditors. Id.
at 1121. The Gregory court noted that courts evaluating good faith should consider whether the
debtor acted honestly and fairly in proposing his plan. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit confronted the good faith issue in In re Kitchens and refused to adopt
the per se substantial repayment requirement. 702 F.2d 885, 888 (lth Cir. 1983). Instead, the
Eleventh Circuit held that courts must examine all the factors of a particular repayment plan.
Id. The Kitchens court noted several factors relevant to a determination of good faith. Id. at
888-89. Two particularly relevant factors include the available financial resources of the debtor
and whether the debtor was honest in presenting the circumstances of the plan. Id.; see infra
notes 107-108 (factors listed by Deans court as relevant in good faith determination).
The District of Columbia Circuit addressed the good faith issue in Barnes v. Whelan and
refused to adopt the per se substantial repayment requirement. 689 F.2d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir.
1982). The Barnes court noted that traditionally, good faith has not required a particular level
of repayment to unsecured creditors. Id. at 198-99. The Barnes court held that courts should
determine good faith based on all the circumstances of a particular plan. Id.
69. See Flygare, 709 F.2d at 1347 (court cited and followed Deans' reasoning in adopting
middle road approach); Johnson, 708 F.2d at 868 (court cited Deans reasoning with approval
in adopting middle road approach).
70. See supra note 68 (discussion of circuits that use middle road approach to determine
good faith). Decisions interpreting and applying chapter 13 often resulted in inconsistent deci-
sions concerning the interpretation of good faith. Compare In re Manning, 5 Bankr. 387, 388
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The Deans approach to interpreting and applying the good faith require-
ment of chapter 13 is sound.7" While previous bankruptcy codes contained
good faith clauses, 72 no court ever expressly interpreted the meaning of good
faith in these provisions.73 Courts implied, however, that good faith generally
required honesty in dealings, a sense of fair play, 74 and no abuse of the provi-
sions or purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.7 The middle road approach, which
(Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1980) (no specific percentage of repayment will insure confirmation of plan
when courts determine good faith on case by case method) with In re Brown, 7 Bankr. 529,
530 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1980) (plan proposing no payment to creditors violates good faith) and
In re Bloom, 3 Bankr. 467, 470-71 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980) (chapter 13 plan must represent
debtor's best financial effort to repay debts for court to find good faith). Additionally, early
interpretations of good faith by courts within the same circuit, such as three district courts within
the Eighth Circuit, yielded conflicting interpretations of good faith. See In re Koerperich, 3 Co'-
LIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 923, 924 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981) (debtor did not propose plan in
good faith when plan proposed no payments to unsecured creditors); In re Thorson, 6 Bankr.
678, 681-82 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1980) (only requirement imposed by Congress regarding amount
of repayment is that chapter 13 debtor must pay unsecured creditors more than creditors would
receive under chapter 7 liquidation); In re Harland, 3 Bankr. 597, 599-600"(Bankr. D. Neb. 1980)
(debtor's plan providing no payments to creditors does not necessarily violate good faith require-
ment). When the Eighth Circuit finally addressed the issue of good faith interpretation, the court
in In re Estus adopted the middle road approach of examining all the circumstances surrounding
a plan. 695 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 1982).
71. See infra notes 72-97 (discussion of Deans court's proper interpretation of good faith
clause); see also Composition, supra note 53, at 661. Courts should interpret good faith to re-
quire the debtor to pay unsecured creditors to the best of the debtor's financial ability rather
than requiring a specific amount of repayment. Id. at 661-62.
72. See Bankruptcy Act § 361, 52 Stat. 911 (1938) (court required good faith by both creditors
and debtors before confirming arrangement between debtor and creditors); Bankruptcy Act §
472, 52 Stat. 923 (1938) (section 472 dictated that court must confirm arrangement between debtor
and creditor if both debtor's proposal and creditor's acceptance of plan are in good faith).
Section 651 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 is similar to § 1325(a)(3). See Bankruptcy Act
§ 651, 52 Stat. 934 (1938). Section 651 stated that the court must be "satisfied that the plan
and its acceptance are in good faith and have not been made or procured by any means, promises
or acts forbidden by this title." Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981) (similarities be-
tween § 1325(a)(3) and § 651).
73. See Ordin, The Good Faith Principle in the Bankruptcy Code, a Case Study, 38 Bus.
LAw. 1795, 1795 (1983) (courts infrequently rendered good faith decisions under previous bankruptcy
codes); 5 COLLIER ON BAuNcRugrcy 1325.01[21[c], at 8 (15th ed. 1983) (no case law exists specifically
discussing good faith requirement of § 651 of Bankruptcy Act of 1938); see also Cyr, The Chapter
13 "Good Faith" Tempest: An Analysis and Proposal for Change, 55 ANI. BANKR. L.J. 271,
276 (1981). (cases decided under Bankruptcy Act do not indicate that good faith required the
establishment of certain quantity of payments).
74. See Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193, 200 (D.C. 1982) In Barnes, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit noted that historically courts construed good faith to mean debtor misconduct involv-
ing such factors as dishonesty or unfairness in the proposal of the bankruptcy plan. Id. at 198;
see also American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 145 (1940)
(court construed good faith provision in prior bankruptcy provision to mean fairness and honesty
in bankruptcy proposals); Gonzalez Hernandez v. Borgos, 343 F.2d 802, 805-06 (1st Cir. 1965)
(institution of bankruptcy proceeding to avoid paying child support constituted bad faith); Cyr,
supra, note 73, at 275-76 (discussing general idea that good faith meant fairness).
75. See Ordin, supra note 73, at 1796. Under previous bankruptcy codes, courts decided
several cases involving the interpretation of good faith. Id. These cases demonstrate that courts
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does not place a substantive requirement on good faith, is consistent with the
traditional construction given by the commentators and courts to the good
faith clauses in previous bankruptcy codes.7"
The Fourth Circuit correctly recognized that the high road method of in-
terpreting good faith, which requires substantial repayment to unsecured
creditors, renders the section 1325(a)(4) substantive requirement useless.7" Sec-
tion 1325(a)(4) of the Act expressly requires the Bankruptcy Court to confirm
a plan only if the plan provides for a creditor to receive more than he would
receive if the debtor was proceeding under chapter 7 liquidation.7 8 Interpreting
the good faith requirement of section 1325(a)(3) to mean substantial repay-
ment to unsecured creditors would render the section 1325(a)(4) substantive
requirement useless because substantial repayment is more than creditors would
receive under chapter 7 liquidation."' Additionally, the legislative history in-
dicates that Congress did not intend the good faith clause in chapter 13 to
require that a debtor propose substantial repayments to unsecured creditors
in order to have the plan confirmed." The legislative history specifically states
interpreted good faith to mean whether someone using the bankruptcy provisions abused the
purposes of bankruptcy process. Id.; see, e.g., In re Metropolitan Realty Corp., 433 F.2d 676,
678 (5th Cir. 1970) (court noted that debtor filed plan under Chapter X of Bankruptcy Act of
1938 in bad faith since debtor was using bankruptcy provisions to accomplish purpose not intend-
ed by bankruptcy code), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1008 (1971); Platt v. Schmitt, 87 F.2d 437, 440
(8th Cir. 1937) (court interpreted good faith provision in Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to require that
participants in bankruptcy proceeding not abuse purpose and spirit of Bankruptcy Act of 1898);
In re Village Men's Shops, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 125, 129 (S.D. Ind. 1960) (court interpreted good
faith provision in chapter XI of Bankruptcy Act of 1938 to require that all participants in chapter
XI proceeding not abuse provisions, purposes, or spirit of chapter XI); In re Paul, 1-3 F. Supp.
645, 647 (S.D. Iowa 1936) (court noted debtor violated good faith clause because the debtor
proposed to use bankruptcy code for ulterior purpose not contemplated by bankruptcy code).
76. See supra notes 72-75 (traditional meaning of good faith did not require examination
of plan's substantive facts, only evaluation of behavior of participants). Bankruptcy Court Judge
Ordin argues that modern bankruptcy courts should continue to use the traditional meaning of
good faith. Ordin, supra note 73, at 1795. The middle road approach is consistent with the tradi-
tional meaning of good faith because one factor middle road courts consider is whether consumer
debtors are abusing the congressional intent underlying chapter 13. See Deans, 692 F.2d at 972.
77. 692 F.2d at 971-72; see infra text accompanying note 79 (high road test requiring substan-
tial repayment disregards § 1325(a)(4) requirement because substantial repayment to unsecured
creditors will always be more than § 1325(a)(4) requires creditors to receive).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (Supp. V 1981); see 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1325.01[D],
at 9-14 (15th ed. 1983) (discussion of § 1325(a)(4) requirement); supra note 21 (comparison of
chapter 7 and chapter 13 requirements).
79. See supra note 40 (requiring good faith to mean substantial repayments renders §
1325(a)(4) useless since substantial repayment is usually more than creditor would receive if debtor
had chosen chapter 7 liquidation); see also supra note 50 (legislative history indicates plan must
pass both § 1325(a)(3) and § 1325(a)(4) requirements).
80. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Naws 5963, 6079. In the House Report, Congress did not discuss good faith in
the context of the amount of repayment. Id. at 118, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
6079. While Congress noted that repayment plans should offer payment to creditors, no reference
is made to any specific percentage of repayment. Id. at 118, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6079; infra note 92 (discussion of congressional intent underlying inclusion of good faith re-
quirement in § 1325(a)(4)).
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that the only substantive confirmation requirement is that creditors receive
more under the debtor's plan than the creditor would receive if the debtor
had chosen chapter 7 liquidation.'
In addition to stating that chapter 13 contains only one substantive con-
firmation requirement, the legislative history of chapter 13 also discusses the
conflicting goals of protecting creditors and allowing debtors to obtain a fresh
financial start.2 Although Congress established two basic goals when enac-
ting chapter 13, the two goals do not yield a clear definition of good faith.
3
The first goal is to allow debtors to repay their debts so that debtors can ob-
tain a fresh start with no oppressive financial obligations.84 The second goal
is to protect the rights of creditors, and to ensure that debtors make an effort
81. H.R. RP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123-124 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6084-85. Congress stated that only one substantive confirmation re-
quirement exists under chapter 13. Id. at 123-24, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 6084-85.
Courts, therefore, may infer that good faith was not meant to include a second substantive re-
quirement requiring substantial repayment to unsecured creditors.
82. See infra notes 86-92 (discussion of conflicting goals of chapter 13). By adopting the
middle road approach, the Fourth Circuit in Deans correctly balanced the two conflicting goals
of treating both the consumer debtors and creditors fairly since determining good faith on a
case by case basis favors neither debtors nor creditors. See infra notes 95-107 (language and legislative
history of amendment to § 1325(a)(3) demonstrates that Deans court correctly analyzed good
faith). Commentators also advocate and support the Deans method for determining good faith.
See Cyr, supra note 73, at 276-77; 5 COLLER ON BANKRUPTCY 1325.01[2][C], at 8.13 (15th
ed. 1983); Composition, supra note 53, at 684. Cyr, a Bankruptcy Court judge, reasons that
requiring substantial repayment as a part of good faith radically changes the historical meaning
of good faith. Cyr, supra note 73, at 276-77. Cyr suggests that in light of conflicting and unclear
legislative goals, the correct method for interpreting good faith is to examine all the circumstances
of the proposed plan including the debtor's financial ability to repay his debts. Id. at 276-77,
287. COLLIER examines the good faith controversy and concludes that the substantial repayment
method is not the correct way to determine good faith. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1325.0112][C],
at 8.13 (15th ed. 1983). COLLIER states that the proper interpretation of good faith is to examine
all the particular circumstances surrounding repayment plans on a case by case basis. Id. The
Composition article suggests that courts should find that a debtor proposed a plan in good faith
when the debtor's plan represents the debtor's best financial effort to satisfy the claims of unsecured
creditors. Composition, supra note 53, at 684. The reasoning underlying the best efforts approach
is that the Bankruptcy Code has other provisions to protect creditors, and courts should not
interpret good faith to mean substantial repayment to creditors in an effort to further protect
creditors. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 96 (amendment to § 1325(a)(3) would require
debtor's best effort).
83. See supra notes 29-30 (examination of general goals of chapter 13 reveals no clear meaning
of good faith); infra note 86 (different readings of legislative history by various courts yielded
inconsistent interpretations of good faith).
84. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6086. Congress intended Chapter 13 to assist debtors in becoming
contributing members of society. Id. The legislative history noted that consumer bankruptcies
had risen 2000 percent in 30 years as numerous consumers became overburdened with debt. Id.
at 116, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6076-77. The legislative history also indicated
that the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 did not adequately protect the consumer debtor. Id. at 116,
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6076-77. Congress therefore enacted the Bankruptcy Act
of 1978 to provide adequate assistance to overburdened consumer debtors. Id. at 117-18, 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 6078; see Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1130 (Supp. V 1981)).
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to repay creditors." These two separate goals have resulted in conflicting
judicial interpretations of good faith.
8 6
Congress has been aware that judicial attempts to accommodate the two
basic goals of chapter 13 have resulted in difficulties in interpreting the good
faith requirement.87 In 1980, Congress attempted to enact amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act that would correct the problem of interpreting the good faith
requirement of section 1325(a)(3). 8 The legislation failed to pass because of
reasons unrelated to the proposed change in the good faith clause.8 9 The pro-
posed amendment would have forced courts to determine good faith by ex-
amining whether a particular debtor's proposed repayment plan was a
"legitimate attempt" by the debtor to repay debts. 90 According to the propos-
85. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 6085. The House Report stated that creditors should receive at least as
much under chapter 13 as they would receive under chapter 7. Id. The House Report further
stated that courts should favor plans which propose repaying creditors over plans which do not
propose repaying creditors. Id.; see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
OF THE UMITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I, 76 (1973), reprinted
in App. 2 COLLmR ON BANKUPTCY (15th ed. 1983). The Bankruptcy Commission stated that
any bankruptcy provision should treat creditors fairly. Id. Since a working system of consumer
credit is essential to a growing and functioning economy, the Commission stated that the bankruptcy
system must treat creditors fairly so that creditors will extend credit to consumers, and keep
the consumer credit system working efficiently. Id. The Commission stated that another goal
of the bankruptcy system is to ascertain efficiently how much the debtor owes the creditor and
how much the creditor will receive. Id. at 79. The Commission report concluded that the bankruptcy
system should not be so costly, slow, or inconvenient that the system does not protect creditor's
rights. Id.
86. See lacovoni, 2 Bankr. at 262. The lacovoni court examined the legislative history and
concluded that Congress enacted chapter 13 to enable consumers to repay debts and to protect
creditors' rights. Id. at 263-64. To assure debt repayment and protect creditors' rights, the facovoni
court therefore concluded that good faith means substantial repayment. Id. at 266-67. But see
In re Estus, 695 F.2d at 315-16. The Estus court noted chapter 13's goal was to relieve debtors
from overburdensome financial responsibilities. 695 F.2d at 315-16. In order to assist debtors,
the Estus court therefore concluded that the middle road totality approach provides the proper
method of determining whether a debtor proposed a plan in good faith. Id.
87. See Cyr, supra note 73, at 281 (Congress attempted to amend § 1325(a)(3) in response
to conflicting interpretations of § 1325(a)(3)); see also supra note 70 (conflicting interpretations
of good faith clause).
88. S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 128(b) (1980). The proposed amendment to § 1325(a)(3)
states:
(a) "The court shall confirm a plan if -
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law,
and represents the debtor's good faith effort;" (new material in italics)
See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussion how proposed amendment would
have changed good faith determination).
89. Cyr, supra note 73, at 281.
90. Id. at 280-82. The amended § 1325(a)(3) would require courts to decide whether the
debtor's plan constituted a legitimate good faith effort by the debtor to repay his debts. Id. Con-
gress intended courts to measure this good faith effort by comparing the debtor's proposed future
payments with the financial ability of the debtor to make such payments. See H.R. REP. No.
1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1980); see also infra note 100 (Congress intended proposed
amendment to require debtors to make legitimate effort to repay debts).
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ed amendment, courts would examine all the circumstances of a particular
plan in determining whether that plan was a legitimate attempt. 9'
Although the proposed amendments did not become law, the legislative
history of the proposed amendments is useful in ascertaining Congress' original
intent regarding the correct interpretation of the good faith requirement of
chapter 13.9 The legislative reports concerning the proposed amendments solid-
ly support the Fourth Circuit's method of ascertaining good faith on a case
by case basis. 93 Congress expressly stated that courts interpreting the amend-
ed section 1325(a)(3) could not impose a confirmation requirement that chapter
13 repayment plans must propose an arbitrary minimum percentage of repay-
ment to creditors. 94 The congressional report further noted that proper inter-
pretation courts interpreting the amended section 1325(a)(3) could not impose
a confirmation that chapter 13 repayment plans must propose an arbitrary
minimum percentage of repayment to creditors. 94 The congressional report
further noted that proper interpretation of the good faith clause could result
91. H.R. REp. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-26 (1980).
92. See Barnes V. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Barnes court stated
that courts must use caution when examining the legislative history of a bill that did not become
law. Id. The Barnes court noted that a cautious examination of the legislative history of the
proposed amendment indicated that Congress realized the interpretative difficulties regarding the
good faith clause of § 1325(a)(3). Id. The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the legislative
history of the proposed amendment indicated the method Congress wanted courts to use when
interpreting the good faith clause. Id.; see Cyr, supra note 73, at 281. Judge Cyr notes that even
though Congress did not enact the amendment to § 1325(a)(3), the legislative history of the amend-
ment is reflective of the legislative intent of § 1325(a)(3). Id.
93. H.R. REP. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-26 (1980). The House Report states that
Congress designed chapter 13 to help debtors repay obligations while avoiding the economic disrup-
tions that usually attend bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 25. The House Report also addressed
the problem of interpreting good faith, and concluded that the good faith requirement should
not force debtors to pay more than they are financially capable of paying. Id. at 25; see also
126 CONG. REc. S15, 174-75 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). Sen. Decon-
cini stated that courts and litigants have abused chapter 13 more than any other Bankruptcy
Code provision. 126 CoNo. REc. at S15, 175. Sen. DeConcini stated that courts have misconstrued
the good faith requirement because they have misinterpreted the legislative intent underlying the
good faith clause. Id. Sen. DeConcini noted that the good faith test is separate and independent
of the best interests test which requires the creditor to receive at least as much in a chapter 13
proceeding as he would have received in a chapter 17 liquidation. Id. He specifically pointed
out that judges should not require any arbitrary level of repayment to confirm a plan. Id. After
stating that the purpose of chapter 13 plans is for debtors to repay creditors, Sen. DeConcini
stated that courts should examine all the circumstances of the proposed repayment plan before
deciding whether to confirm that particular plan. Id. Sen. DeConcini stated that Congress de-
signed chapter 13 for those debtors who want to pay their debts and get a fresh start. Id. Sen.
DeConcini concluded that there are some cases in which nominal repayments would be valid.
Id. Another representative who discussed how courts should determine whether a particular deb-
tor proposed a plan in good faith was Congressman Hyde of Illinois. 126 CONG. REc. H9305
(daily ed. Sept. 22, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Hyde). Rep. Hyde stated that Congress clearly intend-
ed courts to examine all factors of a particular debtor's ability to repay before deciding whether
to approve the repayment plan. Id.
94. H.R. REp. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1980); see supra note 93 (courts should
not require any arbitrary level of repayment before confirming repayment plan).
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in confirmation of a plan that provides no repayment to unsecured creditors
or disapproval of a plan that almost completely repays unsecured creditors."
Thus, by not requiring a particular amount of repayment, the legislative history
of the proposed amendments shows that the Deans court used the correct
method in interpreting good faith.96 The current uniformity among circuit
courts is further evidence that the Deans court correctly interpreted good faith.
97
Policy considerations also support the Deans court's approach to inter-
preting good faith. 9 The public policy inherent in allowing individual debtors
to obtain a new economic start in society dictates that a court should approve
a zero payment plan if the debtor has no other alternative. 99 The Deans court
recognized that in some cases a debtor may propose a plan which represents
a debtor's maximum financial ability to repay debts but proposes no repay-
ment to unsecured creditors.' 0 The Fourth Circuit in Deans implied that such
zero payment plans may satisfy the good faith requirement depending on the
circumstances of the particular case.'' The substantial repayment requirement,
rejected by the Deans court, automatically precludes debtors who are incapable
of making any payments to unsecured creditors from using chapter 13. 12 This
95. H.R. REP. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1980). Congress noted that courts
could confirm a plan that provided no repayments to unsecured creditors if the debtor's financial
situation prevented the debtor from making any payment to an unsecured creditor. Id. Courts
also could deny confirmation of a plan proposing substantial repayment if the debtor was actually
capable of full repayment. Id.; see infra notes 110-111 and accompanying text (hypothetical ex-
amples of confirming plan proposing minimal repayment or denying plan proposing substantial
repayment).
96. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (both policy reasons and legislative history
of proposed amendment support middle road approach).
97. See supra note 68 (all circuits that have addressed good faith question have adopted
middle road approach).
98. See infra text accompanying notes 99-103 (public policy supports middle road approach
as opposed to per se requirement of substantial repayment).
99. See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (discussing policy reasons underlying
middle road approach to interpreting good faith).
100. See 692 F.2d at 972; 126 CoNG. REc. S15,175 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (statement of
Sen DeConcini). Sen. DeConcini stated that public policy dictates that certain situations exist
when a debtor can legitimately use chapter 13 and still be unable to repay his unsecured creditors.
126 CONG. REc. at S15,175. Sen. DeConcini also mentioned that chapter 13 should provide
bankruptcy relief for the consumer debtor receiving welfare or old age assistance who can repay
creditors only a nominal amount. Id. Sen. DeConcini explained that Congress intended chapter
13 to be a legitimate alternative for debtors in financial difficulty who honestly want to repay
debts. Id.
Sen. DeConcini also stated that debtors should not use chapter 13 as a means to escape
their legitimate financial obligations. Id. Sen. DeConcini noted that Congress intended that plans
proposed by debtors should be real efforts, as opposed to "half-hearted" efforts, to repay creditors.
Id. Explaining the real effort concept, Sen. DeConcini stated that debtors using chapter 13 may
have to make some sacrifices in their standard of living. Id. Sen. DeConcini concluded that after
courts examine all the circumstances of the debtor, courts in some cases should require that the
debtor pursue a more modest lifestyle. Id.
101. 692 F.2d at 972.
102. See 126 CoNG. REc. S15,175 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
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per se preclusion of certain debtors from using chapter 13 is contrary to one
of the basic purposes of chapter 13 which is to help consumer debtors repay
debts and obtain a fresh start.
10 3
In addition to the two basic goals of protecting creditors' rights and help-
ing debtors obtain a fresh start, another intended purpose of chapter 13 was
to provide debtors with a flexible method to repay debts. 0 4 As the Deans
court noted, the middle road approach is flexible since a court using the mid-
dle road approach examines each plan on that plan's merits, and does not
confirm or deny the plan based on some inflexible standard such as always
requiring substantial repayment to unsecured creditors.' When the Deans
court adopted the flexible middle road approach, the Fourth Circuit noted
several factors which a court should consider when evaluating a proposer's
good faith. 10 6 The factors listed by the Fourth Circuit for determining whether
Sen. DeConcini noted that Congress intended that certain debtors who are unable to propose
even nominal repayments nevertheless should be allowed to use chapter 13. Id. Debtors unable
to propose even nominal repayments would be unable to meet an arbitrary requirement of substantial
repayment. Id. Debtors unable to meet an arbitrary requirement would be unable to take advan-
tage of chapter 13 proceedings when filing for bankruptcy if courts interpreted good faith to
require substantial repayment. Id.
103. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 116-17 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6076-77. Public policy favors any approach to confirming repayment
plans that allow debtors to repay debts and obtain a fresh start. See id. at 116-17, 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6076-77. The legislative history of chapter 13 suggests that a fresh
start for debtors is an admirable goal consistent with public policy in that a fresh start allows
debtors to once again become economically functioning members of society. Id. at 116-17, 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6076-77.
104. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 141, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5787, 5927. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated that chapter 13 em-
phasizes flexibility by fixing a minimum of mandatory plan provisions. Id. Mandatory provisions
inhibit flexibility because they require a debtor to meet certain requirements in every case before
a decision can be made on the merits of the case. See id.
105. 692 F.2d at 971; see infra text accompanying notes 109-111 (discussion of flexibility
of middle road approach); supra note 68 (circuit courts have adopted totality of circumstances
approach which rejects any per se arbitrary requirement); supra text accompanying notes 98-100
(public policy dictates that courts should allow some debtors to propose plans that do not provide
substantial repayment to unsecured creditors).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 107-108 (Fourth Circuit's list of factors courts should
consider when making good faith determination). In In re Estus, the Eighth Circuit compiled
the most comprehensive list of possible factors courts should consider when determining good
faith. 695 F.2d at 317. The factors included: "(1) the amount of the proposed payments and
the amount of the debtor's surplus; (2) the debtor's employment history, ability to earn and
likelihood of future increases in income; (3) the probable or expected duration of the plan; (4)
the accuracy of the plan's statements of the debts, expenses and percentage repayment of unsecured
debt and whether any inaccuracies are an attempt to mislead the court; (5) the extent of preferen-
tial treatment between classes of creditors; (6) the extent to which secured claims are modified;
(7) the type of debt sought to be discharged and whether any such debt is nondischargeable in
chapter 7; (8) the existence of special circumstances such as inordinate medical expenses; (9) the
frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under the Bankruptcy Reform Act; (10) the
motivation and sincerity of the debtor in seeking chapter 13 relief; and (11) the burden which
the plan's administration would place upon the trustee." Id.
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a particular debtor proposes a plan in good faith included the percentage of
the proposed repayment to unsecured creditors and the available and future
financial resources of the debtor.""7 Other factors listed by the Fourth Circuit
included the honesty of the debtor in presenting the circumstances of the plan,
and any unusual problems or expenses that the debtor may have.' 8 The Fourth
Circuit's recognition that courts should consider more than one factor will
allow bankruptcy courts more flexibility in confirming or denying proposed
repayment plans.' 9 For example, a court could confirm a plan calling for
little repayment to unsecured creditors if the debtor is forthright and open
in his presentation and commits nearly all available financial resources to the
repayment of debts.I" On the other hand, a court could deny confirmation
of a plan that proposed an acceptable percentage of repayment to unsecured
107. 692 F.2d at 972. In addition to the Fourth Circuit, other circuit courts have suggested
that courts should consider the percentage of the proposed repayment as a factor in determining
good faith. See, e.g., Flygare v. Boulden, 709 F.2d 1344, 1347 (10th Cir. 1983) (amount of pro-
posed payment to creditors is factor in good faith determination); In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885,
888 (11th Cir. 1983) (same); In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 1982) (same); In re Rimgale,
669 F.2d 426, 432 (7th Cir. 1982) (substantiality of payment to creditors is element of good faith).
Other circuit courts also have noted that the available and future financial resources of the debtor
are factors to consider in determining good faith. See, e.g., Flygare, 709 F.2d at 1347 (available
financial resources of debtor is factor in good faith determination); Kitchens, 702 F.2d at 888
(same); Estus, 695 F.2d at 317 (same).
108. 692 F.2d at 972. In addition to the Fourth Circuit, other courts have examined the
debtor's honesty in presenting the circumstances as a factor relevant to a determination of good
faith. See, e.g., Flygare, 709 F.2d at 1347 (debtor's honesty and accuracy in presenting plan
is factor in good faith determination); Kitchens, 702 F.2d at 888 (same); Estus, 695 F.2d at 317
(same); Goeb, 675 F.2d at 1390 (factor in determining good faith is whether debtor correctly
and honestly represented the facts of his plan); Rimgale, 669 F.2d at 432 (factor in determining
good faith is whether debtor accurately stated expense items and amount of creditor claims).
Other circuit courts have noted that the debtor's unique or unusual expenses are also a factor
courts should consider when determining good faith. See, e.g., Flygare, 709 F.2d at 1348 (ex-
istence of special circumstances such as major medical expenses is factor in good faith determina-
tion); Kitchens, 702 F.2d at 889 (same); Estus, 695 F.2d at 317 (same).
109. See infra notes 110-111 and accompanying text (examples of how Fourth Circuit's
guidelines will allow courts to take more flexible approach to determining good faith); supra
notes 102-104 and accompanying text (requirement that plans must provide some arbitrary level
of repayment is too restrictive).
110. See H.R. RP. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1980) (legislative history of pro-
posed amendment clearly indicates that courts can confirm plan proposing little repayment to
unsecured creditors). A hypothetical example in which a court could confirm a minimal repay-
ment plan involves consumer debtor X, who proposes a plan providing little repayment to unsecured
creditors. Debtor X has a secured debt of $2,000, secured by an automobile, and unsecured debts
of $6,000. Debtor X proposes a chapter 13 repayment plan in which he states his income as
$700 per month and living expenses as $675 per month. Debtor X proposes to sell the automobile
responsible for the secured debt for $1500 to reduce the secured debt to $500. Debtor X proposes
to pay $25 per month for four years to a trustee for the benefit of his creditors. Debtor X's
proposal will pay off the secured debt and will pay ten percent of the unsecured debts. Debtor
X is open and honest in presenting the facts in his proposal to the Bankruptcy Court. Since
debtor X is using all his excess income to pay debts and is not trying to conceal facts from the
court, the Bankruptcy Court could find that debtor X proposed the plan in good faith.
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creditors in which the debtor claimed extravagant or luxurious expenses."'
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Deans is in accord with the widely ac-
cepted judicial trend of determining good faith by using a case by case
approach." Under this widely accepted judicial trend, the Bankruptcy Court
will have more responsibility in evaluating whether to confirm a particular
repayment plan because neither substantial repayment nor any other single
factor is determinative of good faith. Since no one factor is determinative,
the Bankruptcy Court will have to examine all the circumstances of a propos-
ed plan rather than only determining the percentage of proposed repayment." 13
The Bankruptcy Court also will have to make thorough investigations and
factual findings concerning the factors that determine whether a debtor pro-
posed his plan in good faith.
The Fourth Circuit in Deans v. O'Donnell interpreted the good faith clause
of chapter 13 and held that courts must determine good faith on a case by
case basis instead of relying solely on whether the plan provides substantial
or meaningful repayment to unsecured creditors.' 4 The Deans approach will
permit Fourth Circuit practitioners more flexibility in preparing and filing in-
dividual bankruptcy actions under chapter 13 since no single factor will have
to be present in every case. This added flexibility inherent in the middle road
approach will enable attorneys to help individuals that are heavily in debt
because attorneys can propose a repayment plan satisfying the section 1325
confirmation requirements that will not be financially crippling to the debtor.
In addition, courts using the flexible middle road approach for determining
good faith will allow chapter 13 to achieve its goal of fairly and equitably
solving the debt problem of consumers and creditors.
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111. See 126 CONG. REc. S15,175 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
Sen. DeConcini expressly noted that courts could require debtors to live more modestly, by giving
up certain extravagant expenses, before confirming a repayment plan. Id. A hypothetical exam-
ple of a court requiring a consumer debtor to give up luxurious expenses in order to obtain con-
firmation involves debtor Z, who proposes a plan that provides 80% repayment to unsecured
creditors. The 80% repayment uses all of debtor Z's excess income. Debtor Z lists an income
of $2000 per month and expenses of $1,700 per month. Included in debtor Z's expenses are payments
on a new expensive car and expensive yacht. The Bankruptcy Court could find that debtor Z
is capable of paying back more than 80% of the unsecured debts since the boat and care are
not necessities. The Bankruptcy Court therefore could find that debtor Z proposed his plan in
bad faith because debtor Z is capable of paying more than 80 percent of his unsecured claims.
112. See supra note 68 (discussion of circuit courts' adoption of middle road approach for
determining good faith).
113. See 692 F.2d at 972; see also supra note 107 (some circuit courts recognize that debtor's
proposed percentage of repayment to unsecured creditors is factor for courts to consider when
making good faith determination); supra text accompanying notes 35-36 (no one factor is deter-
minative of good faith).
114. 692 F.2d at 972; see supra notes 63-105 (middle road approach does not emphasize
any particular factor in determining whether debtor proposed plan in good faith).
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